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Abstract
Operating System (OS) kernels have been under research and develop-
ment for decades, mainly assuming single processor and distributed hard-
ware systems. With the recent rise of multi-core chips that may incorpo-
rate a network on chip (NoC), new challenges have appeared that were
not considered before. Given that a complete multi-core system that
works on a single system on chip (SoC) is now the normal case, diﬀer-
ent cores on a single SoC may share other physical resources and data.
This new sharing scheme on a SoC aﬀects crucial aspects of an overall
system like correctness, performance, predictability, scalability and secu-
rity. Both hardware and OSs to ﬂexibly cooperate in order to provide
solutions for such challenges.
SoC mimics the internet somehow now, with diﬀerent cores acting as
computer nodes, and the network medium is given in an advanced digital
fabrics like buses or NoCs, that are a current research area. However,
OSs are still assuming some (hardware) features like single physical mem-
ory and memory sharing for inter-process communication, page-based
protection, cache operations, even when evolving from uniprocessor to
multi-core processors. Such features not only may degrade performance
and other system aspects, but also some of them make no sense for a
multi-core SoC, and introduce some barriers and limitations. While new
OS research is considering diﬀerent kernel designs to cope up with multi-
core systems, they are still limited by the current commercial hardware
architectures.
The objective of this thesis is to assess diﬀerent kernel designs and
implementations on multi-core hardware architectures. Part of the con-
tributions of the thesis is porting RTEMS (RTOS) and seL4 microkernel
to Epiphany and RISC-V hardware architectures respectively, trading-
oﬀ the design and implementation decisions. This hands-on experience
gave a better understanding of the real-world challenges regarding kernel
designs and implementations.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Computer architecture has moved into a new era of the multi-core sys-
tem on chips to overcome the bottleneck of overheating and power con-
sumption within a high frequency uniprocessor system while preserv-
ing Moore's law, so that a single chip can accommodate smaller, and
more, numbers of transistors. This is achieved by dividing up computa-
tion cores from a single high performance uniprocessor, into smaller and
slower cores. Such cores can be identical (homogeneous) or diﬀerent (het-
erogeneous). Hardware designers have striven to make this architecture
change as transparent as possible to the programmer with the cost of
making the hardware more complex, and sometimes lower performance.
This is not an acceptable solution any more.
As Hennessy and Patterson state it clearly in their state-of-art com-
puter architecture book: The La-Z-Boy programmer era of relying on
hardware designers to make their programs go faster without lifting a
ﬁnger is oﬃcially over. [56]
The software has to be re-designed to run in parallel on such multi-
core systems. This will make life (relatively) easier for hardware design-
ers, while increasing the software performance. Re-designing a software
that assumed uniprocessor systems for decades especially if this software
has thousands and millions lines of code is not an easy task. Program-
mers now not only have to worry about their code correctness, but also
they need to take parallelism, performance, scalability and security into
consideration, each with its own challenges. Moreover, hardware and
software designers have to work closely to introduce better solutions in-
stead of working on their own problems separately.
Typically, an OS kernel is the ﬁrst piece of software that deals with
hardware directly, and provides common services to higher level applica-
10
tions. This means that OS kernel developers are the ﬁrst to be exposed
to the new multi-core hardware architecture. On the one hand, con-
temporary monolithic OSs like Linux have been trying to modify their
design to work on multi-core systems in a Symmetric Multiprocessing
(SMP) manner, and developers have to deal with problems and bugs as
they arise. Furthermore, such adoption is not always scalable beyond
some number of cores due to the inherent hardware and software sharing
scheme such monolithic kernels have been designed for. On the other
hand, the research community is working on introducing new OS kernel
designs that are written from scratch [23, 41, 103] (rather than building
on an existing kernel) with multi-core architecture in mind. The later
has helped with introducing new better solutions that can help with scal-
ability, performance, and security.
As the internet has proven that it is scalable and reliable, the new
hardware and OS architectures are embracing many of the old distributed
systems ideas. In fact, network on chips have implemented some of the
same internet-based protocols to work on a single chip. The OS develop-
ers are also trying to adopt old distributed OS ideas that were working
over the internet, to work on a single chip. Since microkernel distributed
system design has been of a big success, current research OSs are inspired
by microkernel and message passing designs. Such research OS kernels
are like pure microkernel, multikernel and factored OSs.
Unfortunately such promising research OSs are still being limited
by the current commercial hardware architecture constraints such as
(non scalable) caches, page-based granularity for memory protections,
memory sharing for inter-process communication, etc. Some of them are
only prototypes that run on simulators only.
The goal of this thesis is to address the issues that diﬀerent OS de-
signs face when written (or ported) to run on multi-core hardware ar-
chitectures. In fact, hardware architecture greatly aﬀects the design and
implementation of OS kernel designs and implementations. Some kernel
designs work well on multi-core architectures like microkernels and mul-
tikernels, basically because of their message passing model, scalability
and modularity, but others do not. Furthermore, the hardware architec-
ture might prevent an OS from implementing one or more of its design
principles. Basically, an OS manages the three basic components of a
hardware computing system: CPU(s), memories and IO, and it exports
11
an interface to applications in the form of services. That is what an OS
in general is for. OS designs diﬀer in which service goes into which layer
(kernel/privilege layer or user/application layer, and sometimes hypervi-
sor layer) and how diﬀerent OS and application components communicate
with each other (securely). Figure1.1 is an example of diﬀerent kernel
designs.
A basic set of services that a typical OS would provide are memory
management, scheduling, Inter Process Communication (IPC) and de-
vice drivers. Diﬀerent kernel designs tend to end up into two old rivals:
monolithic and microkernel. Other kernel designs like hybrid, multiker-
nel and factored OS can be considered as derivatives of the two major
ones.
On the one hand, monolithic kernels get the advantage of performance
and a rich set of services and device drivers implemented in a privileged
mode. Its high performance is due to the fact that the communication
between applications, kernel and services are just direct function calls
and/or system calls. On the other hand, microkernels get the advantage
of modularity between its subsystems that enable it to be split up into
separate physical hardware cores, making it highly scalable, unlike mono-
lithic kernels. However, such scalability and modularity features come
with a performance overhead incurred within the message-passing IPC
component as every microkernel subsystem (including the microkernel,
applications and device drivers) interacts with one another using this
IPC layer.
With the beginning of the multi-core era both designs are trying to
make use of the new cores and parallelism, and both face issues. To give
an example, some hardware architectures with low memory resources
might require the kernel services to be split up into diﬀerent cores with
distributed memory. This is possible with microkernels, but might be
impossible with monolithic kernels. Similarly, some hardware features
like cache coherency and shared memory work well with monolithic
kernel, but not with microkernels. Networks on chip and new hardware
security implementations can be easily/better utilised by microkernel's
components like message-passing and capability management to boost
performance and security, but might make no sense for a monolithic
kernel (if it does not break its functionality and/or design principles).
In order to get an actual real-world experience of these issues, this
12
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thesis reports the eﬀort of porting diﬀerent kernel designs like RTEMS
(as a monolithic RTOS), and seL4 microkernel to diﬀerent multi-core sys-
tems like Epiphany/Parallella and RISC-V architectures. RTEMS and
seL4 are cutting-edge OSs that have been deployed in important real-
world safety critical projects (involving NASA and military projects),
and both can be regarded as a state-of-art of its kind. Ports of RTEMS
to both OpenRISC and Epiphany are already upstream, and currently
being used and developed part of other projects. Furthermore, RTEMS is
on its early stages of supporting SMP, so porting it to Epiphany (with 16
cores), enabled us to investigate pros and cons of RTEMS SMP support
and Epiphany (as a new multi-core chip), along with proposing ideas to
improve both. It is noticed that trying to convert a monolithic kernel like
RTEMS to other designs was not practical on a multi-core architecture
like Epiphany. The thesis discusses the reasons why that was not possi-
ble, giving a motivation to investigate another kernel design like seL4 on
another hardware architecture. seL4 microkernel is more sophisticated
than RTEMS (from design perspective), and requires more hardware fea-
tures and resources. So, porting it to RISC-V architecture gives a better
understanding of the hardware requirements needed for microkernels not
only to run, but also to scale and maintain its simplicity and security
features.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of hardware architecures along
with OS designs and examples. The chapter also dicusses how those
OS implementations ﬁt with hardware architecures, and the issues in-
volved. Chapter 3 gives a hands-on experience (author's contribution) of
the challenges faced while porting RTEMS to Epiphany multi-core NoC.
The chapter concludes hardware limitations of Epiphany, and shows the
motivation to use a more ﬂexible hardware like RISC-V. Chapter 4 gives
an overview of RISC-V hardware architecure and seL4 microkernel, and
summarizes the porting experience of seL4 to RISC-V. Chapter 5 dis-
cusses the issues of OSs on multi-core architecures, and proposes solu-
tions. Finally comes the conclusion in chapter 6.
14
Chapter 2
Field Survey and Review
The following sections cover the literature of the components of the stack
that are involved with the issues discussed in the introduction. These
components are OSs and multi-core hardware architectures. The review
will only deal with multi-core hardware and OSs research topics giving
some examples of them and how they propose solutions for scalability,
performance and security.
2.1 Architecture of Multiprocessor Systems
In this section the research about multi-core multiprocessor System on
Chip (SoC) is discussed, traditional single-core systems and clustered
internet-based distributed systems are beyond this survey as the focus
is on the single chip/board level. Designing and implementing Multi-
Processor System on Chip (MPSoC) have trade-oﬀs and challenges. Most
notably the trade-oﬀ between hardware and software support for such a
system. Making the programmer's life easier comes with the cost of a
complex hardware support which consumes power, size, and sometimes
introduces programming limitations, performance degradation and suf-
fers from scalability issues (like cache-coherency). On the other hand, it
is possible to reduce the hardware cost and complexity by exposing the
MPSoC architecture to the programmer, who in turn can make the best
use of this parallel hardware, even better than the hardware support, or
might totally disrupt the hardware he/she is working on by writing buggy
and error-prone programs due to ignorance of how to deal with such a
new hardware design and software model (message passing model for ex-
ample). In the following section some of the hardware architectures are
provided and the focus will be on memory organisation of such systems
15
as it is the crucial component that aﬀects correctness and performance
and OS kernel designs and implementations. In the section that follows
it, OS solutions are discussed.
2.1.1 Shared Memory Multiprocessor Architectures
Uniprocessors were easy to program, the programmer was only required
to write a correct sequential software while performance and instruction-
level parallelism techniques were left to the hardware designer. Since
2003, uniprocessors could not keep up with Moore's law by having more
transistors on the same uniprocessor chip, mainly because of power con-
sumption and heat bottlenecks that come with higher clock frequencies
and an increase in the number of transistors. Although multiprocessor
implementations were already there since the early days of computers,
they were only part of research and mainframes ﬁelds (in data centres).
So, to get over such an issue, multiprocessor designs have been imple-
mented at the chip/board level that we know today as multi-core proces-
sors. Multiprocessor architectures vary but they fall into two super cate-
gories according to the memory organisation: Symmetric Shared Memory
Multiprocessors (SMP), and Distributed Shared Memory Multiprocessors
(DSM). Both architectures are discussed below.
Symmetric Shared Memory Multiprocessors
SMP means that for a system that has multiple processors sharing mem-
ory, each processor has the same memory access latency with one an-
other. Thus, all processors share the same physical main memory with
equivalent access latency as shown in ﬁgure 2.1.
The adoption of caches, originally to increase performance and re-
duce memory latency, for this architecture makes it more complicated
than uniprocessors. If more than one processor have their own caches
that may contain a copy of a shared data in main memory, there must be
a way to enforce coherency of this shared data across diﬀerent processor's
caches when read and written. Diﬀerent cache coherency protocols have
been implemented to handle such a hurdle. Snoopy caches is a protocol
to achieve coherency. In snoopy caches, each processor's cache that has
a copy of a shared data monitors the memory bus for any updates by
other processors. The main problem with snoopy caches is that with the
increasing number of cores and caches, the monitoring process would add
16
Figure 2.1: Basic structure of a centralized shared-memory multiproces-
sor based on a multi-core chip [56]
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a memory latency overhead due to bus contention, and might saturate
the memory bus. That is why snoopy caches and SMP do not scale well
beyond small number of processors. New solutions have been proposed
like multi-level caches, but still they do not scale well. So another archi-
tecture is needed if scalability is a concern, which is Distributed Shared
Memory.
Distributed Shared Memory Multiprocessors
Distributed Shared Memory with caches, also known as ccNUMA (an
abbreviation of Cache Coherent Non-Uniform Memory Access) is a way
to build scalable multiprocessor systems that avoid the issues discussed
in the previous SMP section. Attempts to build ccNUMA multiprocessor
machines to address scalability challenges at the hardware level go back
to the early 90s. DASH (Directory Architecture for Shared Memory) [67]
is one of these early attempts to build a ccNUMA machine developed by
Stanford University and is the ﬁrst operational ccNUMA machine and is
considered the base of modern ccNUMA architectures known today (SGI
2000 [65], SGI Altix [105], IBM Bluegene [79] and modern clustered SMP
that will be discussed later). The motivation to build DASH was to ﬁgure
out a way to build a scalable cache coherent machine that performs well
with the increasing number of processors and competes with the scalable
message-passing machines at this time. The solution was to divide up the
physical shared memory into smaller physical ones, all of these smaller
memories combined act as a single logical address space shared memory
that the programmer assumes with cache coherency retained. The trick
to construct this kind of physically scattered, logically shared address
space was hidden by the hardware implementation.
Figure 2.2 shows a transition from a single shared memory architec-
ture to ccNUMA.
A new hardware structure called the directory was introduced 1 to
avoid the scalability limitations that come with the traditional snoopy
caches. A directory is like a front-end gate of a small computing clus-
ter consisting of one or more processors with a shared (snoopy) cache
and physical memory; this directory connects the clusters to an intercon-
nection network which connects other clusters together. Each directory
1Directories can be implemented in SMP machines where the outermost cache
level (i.e. L3) implements a directory that keeps track of cache blocks held by private
caches, and that is how Intel i7 cores work. However the directory concept discussed
in this literature assumes DSM only.
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keeps track of what data its memory has, and what data are cached in
this cluster, and it has references to other clusters containing a copy of
this data. This way the directory can make point-to-point invalidation
operations to the caches that are involved only instead of the non-scalable
broadcast method.
2.1.2 Memory Consistency
Memory consistency is a major concern when it comes to constructing
multiprocessor shared-memory systems. The main question is, what is
the order of memory operations from multiple processors as seen by the
memory and/or the program? The set of allowable memory access or-
derings forms the memory consistency model or event ordering model
for an architecture. [50]. The consistency model is also deﬁned to be a
contract between the software and the memory [13]. There are diﬀerent
types of memory consistency models: strict, sequential [64], processor,
weak, [13] and release [50] consistency models. Some of the consistency
models are intuitive like strict consistency, but are ineﬃcient from a per-
formance point of view, while other models aim to relax the limitations
incurred by each other to increase performance, but usually this makes
it harder for the programmer.
2.1.3 Message Passing Networks-on-Chip-based Pro-
cessors
Shared memory architectures are intuitively not scalable especially
when there are many processors contending for a data structure on
the same physical location of memory. Even with DSM architectures
like directory-based ccNUMA that aims to enhance scalability, it is
believed that even ccNUMA will not be able to cope up with increasing
number of cores beyond 1000+ cores [103, 23] due to the complexity and
communication overhead needed to preserve coherency between caches.
As the internet-based distributed system proved it can be scalable
for millions of devices, current SoC trend tends to adopt the message
passing nature of the internet on the chip level, using NoCs. This
allows a processor to scale well on the chip/board level. Such NoC
based many-core systems already exist and even manufactured by
big semi-conductor companies like Intel [59], while it is currently an
20
important research area within universities [80, 5, 3].
Modern multi-core architectures tend to maintain a mixture of SMP
and DSM and some integrate NoCs to get the best features of each.
Tilera [39] is a recent non-uniform scalable multi-processor chip with
caches and cores connected to each other by iMesh NoC and it also
uses message passing. Coherency on Tilera is maintained by directories.
AMD Opteron has 48 cores, cache coherency is implemented by MOESI
protocol [106] while Intel Xeon has 80 cores divided up into 8 chips,
each of which has two 10 cores. Each chip maintains cache coherency
using snooping protocol, and broadcasting is used to achieve coherency
across diﬀerent chips. Sun Niagara 2 has 8 cores and each core is
able to handle 8 hardware threads, thus, it can run up to 64 hardware
threads. Communication between cores can occur using a crossbar
network and cache coherency is directory-based. Epiphany [12] is a new
NoC architecture with small 32/64 RISC cores each of which has its
own 32 KiB addressable local memory, while all of them can access a
shared oﬀ-chip RAM. Epiphany NoC completely discards any caches,
and all the communication on the NoC is message-passing oriented. The
founders of Epiphany claim that their architecture can be scaled up to
millions of cores, with the only limitation being the size of the address
space (hence, number of addressable cores, since every core has 1 MiB
address space).
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2.2 Operating Systems
OSs traditionally were the lowest level of software that is managing the
hardware directly. They provide all the required functionalities that ap-
plications need in order to execute and do their job in a way that makes
the hardware transparent to application developers. The core part of an
OS that is dealing with hardware directly is usually called the kernel.
Diﬀerent kernel designs have been implemented, each with its pros and
cons. Some kernel designs are better working on some hardware archi-
tectures than others. In this section a few well-known kernel designs
are discussed along with their abstractions and, when it applies, some of
their features that this thesis is concerned with.
2.2.1 RTOS
A Real-Time OS (RTOS) is mostly concerned with determinism and
predictability. That is, knowing when a task would be triggered, its
response time and when and for how long it can handle a speciﬁc
request, all of these are crucial aspects of an RTOS. It may even
sacriﬁce performance for the sake of predictability. There are two super
categories of RTOSs (or real-time systems in general): hard real-time,
and soft real-time.
In hard real-time systems, a task has a strict deadline; a system will
fail if this deadline was not met. On the other hand, in soft real-time
systems, some tasks have (soft) deadlines that can be missed, and
the system would still operate correctly. Depending on application
requirements, hard and soft deadlines for tasks are determined.
RTOSs have applications mostly in safety-critical embedded system
world like: aerospace, medical devices, vehicle control, military applica-
tions, robots, cell phones, etc. There are many RTOSs, RTEMS [82] is a
successful open-source RTOS that has made it to planet Mars [109, 45],
and is discussed in details in the following section as an example of an
RTOS. Other RTOSs share the same features with RTEMS, especially
when it comes to scheduling algorithms. RTOSs may need some special
hardware features like counters and timers.
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2.2.2 Exokernel
Exokernel [46] design motivates the idea that applications are the best
to know their requirements, and hence they can achieve great perfor-
mance boost without being restricted to the underlying traditional OS
interfaces. With exokernel, application developers should be aware of
the hardware they are dealing with, thus, making application program-
ming to require more knowledge and eﬀort. Exokernel draws a ﬁrm line
between what a kernel does, and what applications do. The exokernel
is only responsible for security/protection and multiplexing hardware re-
sources, no abstractions, management or policies are included part of the
exokernel layer. It then exposes the hardware resources to applications,
enabling them to have direct access to manage the hardware in an ef-
ﬁcient and optimised way, given that they know what they are doing.
This way, the exokernel implementation can focus on the security, and
reduces the number of potential bugs, given that it would be very small,
and hence can be easily debugged. The application level is the layer that
is fully responsible of any management and policies, and it can be as big
as a full libOS (library OS), that entirely operates in user-level mode.
The library or applications are referred to as untrusted software. Unlike
microkernels (discussed later), exokernel excludes virtual memory man-
agement and Inter Process Communication (IPC) from the kernel layer,
and leaves it to the libOS. This is an issue with conventional hardware ar-
chitectures because some operations (like virtual memory management)
can not be done in user-level, and applications would need to trap to the
kernel anyway. This is an example of how a hardware architecture may
prevent a kernel design principle from being implemented.
For an application and/or a library OS to execute, exokernel has
three main mechanisms to expose hardware resources through a secured,
well-deﬁned API:
• Secure Binding.
• Visible Resource Revocation.
• Abort Protocol.
Secure binding is a way to bind a libOS to a speciﬁc resource upon
request. So, a libOS would ask for a given resource from the exokernel,
and then the exokernel would check for potential protection violations,
and if there are not any, it would grant the resource to the libOS in the
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form of encrypted key, and subsequent accesses to this resource from
the granted libOS would no longer require exokernel intervention (that
depends on the type of resource). Secure binding can be implemented in
three ways: 1) hardware, 2) software caching and 3) download code into
the kernel.
Resource revocation is an exokernel operation that takes back a
resource given to a libOS and may claim it to another libOS. The
revocation process notiﬁes the libOS that has the resource which is to be
revoked with hardware information (e.g. page frame number to be taken
back) so that it can take the proper actions. Code can be downloaded
into the kernel by a libOS so that every time a given resource is
to be revoked, the exokernel would automatically invoke this libOS
handler in its kernel context, without the overhead of notifying the libOS.
Abort protocol deﬁnes the actions to be taken if a libOS failed to
handle a resource revocation request from the exokernel; in this case,
the exokernel takes the appropriate actions such as taking back the
resources by force and/or killing the failed libOS and its associated
applications.
Exokernel design is simple, small, scalable and secure, it can act as a
hypervisor, the main issue is that it has not been researched well enough,
and it can be considered as an extreme version of a microkernel, not a
totally diﬀerent design. Furthermore, due to the feature that enables
applications to download code to the kernel to increase performance (e.g.
exception handlers that might implement policies), exokernel tends to be
converted to microkernels or even monolithic kernels. exokernel might
do well on distributed multi-core systems (with low memory resources)
thanks to its small-size and message-passing nature, but again, this has
not been tried out or researched yet.
2.2.3 L4 Microkernel
L4 Microkernel is the fourth generation of Liedtke's microkernel [69]
design. Microkernels were created to reduce the complexity of traditional
monolithic OSs that try to implement every possible abstraction an
application may request. Instead, microkernel embraces the idea of only
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implementing the required code to manage the hardware in a privileged
manner, and move any other abstractions/policies (that do not require
privileged access) to user-level. This way, the kernel size would be
minimised and it would be easier to debug and maintain. Because other
discussed kernel designs (like exokernel, FOS and multikernel) tend to
be microkernel-like and/or derivatives, microkernel topic is discussed in
more details.
A microkernel should guarantee subsystems independence and in-
tegrity. Independence means that it is possible to create new subsystems
that can not mess with each other's contexts. The main abstractions of
a microkernel are:
• Address Spaces.
• Threads and IPC.
• Unique Identiﬁers.
A microkernel should act as a manager of the underlying hardware
memory protection/translation mechanism (e.g. MMU). It should ab-
stract away the management of such resources transparently. This means
that a microkernel would keep track of each user-level thread mappings
(i.e. page-tables mapping and/or TLB entries). Operations on a given
address space are exposed by a microkernel to enable memory manage-
ment handling in user-space, thus, this supports building new address
spaces by user-level applications without knowing the hardware details.
The microkernel achieves this goal by providing some operations associ-
ated with an address space:
• Grant: Means that a thread that owns a page frame can give it to
another thread, and remove it from its own address space.
• Map: Unlike grant, mapping a page would enable the owner thread
and the other thread that the owner maps one of its pages into its
address space to access the same page.
• Flush: Revoke the pages (by the owner) that were given using
grant/map operations from non-owner address spaces.
Threads and IPC are major characteristics about microkernels, and
they are important topics when it comes to trade-oﬀs and performance
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analysis. IPC is the way to exchange messages between microkernel-
based subsystems (between threads with each other, and/or between
threads and the microkernel). IPC is a critical microkernel operation as
it is the standard way of communication and its implementation has a
great eﬀect on the overall performance of a microkernel-based system.
Thus, it should be carefully implemented and optimised to decrease its
inherent overhead. In fact, one of the major criticisms for microkernels is
its performance degradation due to IPC compared to monolithic kernel
function calls.
The microkernel should also provide a way to generate unique iden-
tiﬁers for its subsystems. An example is when a thread wants to send
a message to another one, it will use an identiﬁer as an address for the
destination thread. Similarly, an address space may have identiﬁers that
can be useful during context switches (ASID).
History and changes of L4 microkernels
L4 microkernels, originally developed by Liedtke [69], have been in exis-
tance for over 20 years. Since then, microkernels have been improved and
it was proven that the concepts of microkernels are not only applicable,
but also competitive to other kernel designs from a performance perspec-
tive. Some implementations of L4 microkernels have been deployed to
billions of mobile phones and safety critical systems [44], asserting micro-
kernel capabilities as well as security advantage compared to other kernel
designs. A time-line of microkernel implementations during the last 20
years is shown in ﬁgure2.3.
Some of the design principles have changed since Liedtke's paper
that introduced [69] L4 microkernel, but all of the L4 derivatives adhere
the minimality principle. Elphinstone and Heiser [44] discus the trade-
oﬀs and changes to microkernels in details, some of them are given below.
Long IPC Long IPC in L4 was a way to transfer long strings from
a thread context (sender) to another (receiver). The problem with this
long IPC is that when doing a send syscall on an IPC context of the
sender that may not be fully mapped, the kernel may incur a page fault
during the copying process. This is not a desired behaviour as the kernel
assumes all interrupts and concurrency to be disabled. Moreover, L4
terminology is to handle page faults in user-level, not in the kernel, this
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Figure 2.3: The L4 family tree (simpliﬁed). Black arrows indicate code,
green arrows Application Binary Interface (ABI) inheritance. Box colours
indicate origin as per key at the bottom left. [44]
user-level handler may use one or more syscalls, hence it raises nested
exceptions in the kernel, a thing that is not desired. That is why almost
all of the L4 kernels have discarded long IPC features, and used shared
buﬀers.
IPC timeout has been abandoned in seL4 and OKL4. The main
reason is that there was no way to determine the exact time for a
timeout. Instead of making the kernel choose an arbitrary timeout,
this can be done by the user for example using a timer's wait system call.
Synchronous IPC have been the major model so far, but recently
some of the problems have appeared due to this model when it comes
to multi-core scalability and multi-threaded approaches. For example
a thread that wants to communicate with another thread will have to
initiate an inter-core request (which is costly) and blocks waiting for a
reply. The solution was given by seL4 by introducing asynchronous IPC.
As discussed before, original L4 model used thread IDs for commu-
nication between threads. There were some problems associated with
thread IDs like poor performance and the possibility that a server may
reply to the wrong thread. This was replaced in seL4 for example using
a new endpoint implementation. Endpoint is a middle-ware entity that
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accepts requests from senders and sends it to receivers. Each thread
that wants to use any sort of communication should have a capability to
a given endpoint (discussed later in seL4 example).
The Clans and Chief model that manages the way IPC occurs
was believed to be very insuﬃcient. This was replaced by capability
access control in seL4 and Fiasco.OC
Microkernels have been known for their security, scalability and vir-
tualisation features. To enforce security, they need some hardware units
like MMU and diﬀerent CPU privilege levels. Thanks to their mini-
mality, modularity and message-passing IPC design principles, they can
work greatly on DSM, multi-core and NoC-based hardware architectures.
This might be the proper time for microkernels to rise again in the era
of multi-core systems.
2.2.4 Multikernel
Multikernel [23] is a new kernel design originally proposed by ETHZ
Systems Group and Microsoft Research. The authors of the paper argue
that current OS designs will not cope up with the increasing number of
cores and the MPSoC revolution, and propose the multikernel design as
a solution that introduces new principles for an OS to be scalable:
• Inter-core communication should be explicit.
• OS should be hardware agnostic.
• No shared data structures, instead the state would be duplicated.
The main motivation for such a new design is that experimental (and
practical) results exposed the ineﬃciency of current shared-memory OS
designs that assume speciﬁc hardware features such as cache-coherency.
The results doubt that such OS designs on cache-coherent shared-
memory systems will scale to more than 80 cores. The reason is mainly
due to cache update contentions. Moreover, the concept of shared data
structures that OSs have been adopting limits scalability opportunities.
When moving from the single-core design to multi-core, OSs had to
implement new multiprocessor locking protocols. Such protocols either
assume a given speciﬁc hardware design (ccNUMA), or they would not
scale well. Besides, when re-factoring an OS that was written for a single
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core system, to work on a multi-core environment, locking granularity
becomes a bottleneck for scalability, and for software developers, and
would introduce more bugs (i.e. a developer may forget to protect a
data structure with a lock).
For heterogeneous systems, it is almost impossible to port a
traditional OS to work with diﬀerent Instruction Set Architectures
(ISAs) at the same time, hence this restricts an OS to support only a
homogeneous SoC, while this SoC may have other co-processors or cores
that can be utilised to increase performance for custom application needs.
For the previous reasons, multikernel design adopts the no-sharing
and hardware agnostic principles. No-sharing would avoid the use of
locking at all, and consequently, its hardware dependency. Instead,
(asynchronous) message passing is used for communication between
diﬀerent cores (no implicit cache-coherent transactions assumed). While
there are arguments between the performance of shared-memory versus
message passing models, the paper shows that message passing outper-
forms shared-memory when the number of cores increases (see ﬁgure
2.4). This way, a multikernel OS can resemble a distributed system and
adopt the scalable algorithms that were invented in such a ﬁeld, but this
time, at the level of the SoC.
The main issue for the multikernel design, while it is a new promising
one, is that its few implementations (mainly Barrelﬁsh that was given
as the ﬁrst multikernel prototype in the same paper) are still restricted
by the hardware limitations like cache-coherency despite the multiker-
nel hardware-agnostic abstraction. Barrelﬁsh has only been ported to
Intel-based architectures and ARM. It would be more convenient for a
multikernel implementation to work on FPGAs in order to easily discard
the hardware limitations introduced by ASIC processors, and to add new
features on the hardware level that ﬁt with the multikernel requirements.
Moreover, like exokernel, multikernel can be considered as separate in-
stances of a microkernel running and communicating with each other. In
fact, seL4 and Quest (discussed later) OSs can be conﬁgured as multik-
ernels while they are originally microkernels.
29
Figure 2.4: Comparison of the cost of updating shared state using shared
memory and message passing. The curves labelled SHM18 show the
latency per operation (in cycles) for updates that directly modify 1, 2,
4 and 8 shared cache lines respectively. The curves labelled MSG1 and
MSG8, show the cost of synchronous RPC to the dedicated server thread.
[23]
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2.3 Multi-core Operating Systems Examples
2.3.1 RT PREEMPT and LITMUS - Linux
Despite being a monolithic kernel that is intended to run on desktops
and servers, Linux has been patched to support hard real-time tasks
via a patch known as RT PREEMPT [6]. Originally, Linux was only
supporting soft real-time tasks. RT PREEMPT patch introduced some
(relatively) minimal changes in order to convert the Linux kernel into a
real-time one. The changes are mainly concerned with enabling kernel
pre-emption within contexts like: spin-locks, critical sections, interrupt
handling and interrupt-disable code.
The patch also implemented high resolution timers and timeouts,
making it possible to support high resolution POSIX operations in user
space. Moreover, it preserves priority inheritance implementation within
kernel mutexes and spinlocks.
Some of the RT PREEMPT patch has made it to the Linux kernel
mainline, while the rest is still kept synchronized against every release
of the Linux kernel in a set of patches. The RT PREEMPT patch is
currently maintained and has its own web-page [6] with details how
to get the patches, apply it and even run a real-time hello world example.
LITMUS [36] is the testbed based on Linux that investigates and anal-
yses real-time scheduling algorithms (global and partitioned) like Pfair
[58] and Global EDF on SMP multiprocessors, and compares their per-
formance.
2.3.2 RTEMS
RTEMS, Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems [82] is a
free open-source RTOS. It has been ported to over 16 architectures
and about 180 Board Support Packages (BSPs), and it includes API
standards such as POSIX. RTEMS has been widely used for automotive
control, robotics, medical devices, aerospace, military and industrial
applications. Most notably, NASA [7, 8] has utilised RTEMS. More
details are given about RTEMS (here and in the next chapter) as it is
used part of this thesis as a representative monolithic RTOS.
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RTEMS is modular and extendible [9, 49], and is structured as a set
of managers (e.g. for semaphore, IO, barrier and memory), with a core
manager used by other managers.
RTEMS has support for many scheduling policies. The scheduling
framework in RTEMS [29] allows for user deﬁned pluggable policies.
Standard RTEMS schedulers include: priority, earliest deadline ﬁrst and
constant bandwidth scheduler.
SMP Support on RTEMS
RTEMS has basic support for SMP [83] on the SPARC [37], ARM, x86
and PowerPC CPUs.
The prerequisite for porting RTMES SMP support to a new archi-
tecture is the provision of an atomic operation. This can be achieved
using atomic operation support in GCC (if available for the platform),
or by extending RTEMS. Also, additional low-level functions are required
within RTEMS, including synchronization management via ticket locks.
Platform dependent core identiﬁcation functions are required, used
for a purposes like distinguishing between the boot processor and other
secondary processors, acquiring per-cpu information, assigning a thread
to a speciﬁc processor and other operations. RTEMS uses linear num-
bers for cores starting with 0, up to the number of cores minus one.
Normally a core with the 0 ID is called the boot processor, which is the
one that initialises the whole system including the secondary processors,
and makes them ready for executing parallel thread applications. Some
inter-processor interrupt functions must exist for cores to communicate
with each other.
SMP Initialisation
Figure 2.5 summarizes the current SMP initialisation process on RTEMS.
Boxes with black background refer to processes that happen on both
boot and secondary CPUs. Boxes with white background are for op-
erations done by the boot CPU only while grey background is for sec-
ondary CPU(s) operations. Operations on both types of CPUs (boot and
secondary) are done in parallel until the boot CPU indicates for other
CPUs to start multi-tasking. Once all CPUs have started multi-tasking,
they can execute threads, communicate, exchange messages and/or as-
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sign threads to each other (if supported by the conﬁgured SMP sched-
uler). Currently, there are three types of messages that one CPU can
send to another one: 1) shut-down, 2) test, and 3) cache management. A
message type code is injected into _Per_CPU_Information structure
associated with the targeted CPU, then an inter-processor interrupt is
sent to this CPU.
A few SMP scheduling algorithms exist on RTEMS. The default one
is Priority Fixed SMP which is an extension to the uniprocessor Priority
Fixed Scheduler. It is a global scheduler that maintains ready threads in
a shared array with each entry pointing to a queue of threads having the
same priority level. Simple SMP scheduler is another extension to unipro-
cessor Simple Priority Fixed Scheduler. It uses just one queue (doubly
linked list) to maintain ready threads. Partition/Cluster Scheduler can
also be used using some utility functions. A major problem, that SMP on
RTEMS currently faces, is the usage of giant global lock. This giant lock
limits the peformance of the whole system especially when the numbers
of cores and threads (that need frequent access to the kernel e.g. system
calls and share kernel data structures) increase. Finer grained locks are
needed to make RTEMS more scalable and allow concurrency within the
kernel (hence increase performance).
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Figure 2.5: SMP Initialization on RTEMS
2.3.3 seL4
seL4 is a new open-source L4 microkernel developed by NICTA and now
owned by General Dynamics C4 Systems. It gained its popularity being
The world's ﬁrst operating-system kernel with an end-to-end proof of
implementation correctness and security enforcement and is now open
source. [107] seL4 developers believe that it is the state-of-art L4
microkernel currently. L4 simplicity concept has been achieved in seL4
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given that it has about 10K lines of C code, compared to Fiasco.OC
which has 36K lines of C/C++ code. Currently seL4 is ported to only
two architectures: ARM and IA-32 2. Only the ARM port is formally
veriﬁed, and both support only 32-bit implementation, however the
64-bit implementation is a work in progress. The IA-32 port supports
booting in multikernel mode unlike the ARM port.
There are diﬀerent types of kernel abstractions:
• CNode
• TCB
• Endpoints (synchronous and asynchronous)
• Virtual Address Space
• Interrupts
• Untyped memory
CNode, is a key implementation of the capability-based management
for access control. A CNode is a table of slots that may contain other
CNodes or capabilities. Like the hardware page-tables, CNodes are
constructed in multi-level tables layout. Each capability has its exclusive
address within the task, provided its root CNode. This address is used
to refer to this capability and do operations on it (i.e. mint, copy,
revoke, etc).
TCB (Task Control Block) is a control structure for seL4 threads.
Each thread has its own kernel TCB that contains related kernel data
about this task. TCBs have ﬁxed size for each architecture.
Endpoints enables tasks to communicate with each other and
exchange messages through the IPC buﬀer and/or physical message
registers. There are two kinds of Endpoints: synchronous and asyn-
chronous. Synchronous endpoints are mainly used for communication
between threads, while asynchronous endpoints can be used for inter-
rupts delivery.
2RISC-V port is already there but has not been upstream (yet).
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Each task has its own address space as with most OSs3. Depending
on the architecture, address space structures are constructed and
managed through the kernel. The kernel keeps track of each task's
address space (page-tables) and ensures that there are no memory
violations between tasks and other seL4 system components. This is a
major abstraction for microkernels in general.
The kernel receives hardware interrupts and exceptions, and sends
them to the right thread (that may contain a handler) through an
asynchronous endpoint. There is a table for each IRQ that keeps track
of IRQ states.
After seL4 has mapped its own kernel image and user-level frames,
the remaining unused memory is given to the root task as untyped
memory. Untyped memory can be then used by the applications to
allocate new objects, and manage them, without the overhead of kernel
syscalls.
seL4 is used as a representative of microkernel design in this thesis.
It is discussed in more details in chapter 4.
2.3.4 Quest
Quest [104] is a new OS that can be conﬁgured for uniprocessor, SMP,
or as a distributed multikernel in multi-core systems with predictable
performance. It tries to make use of hardware virtualization capabilities
as well as supporting real-time oriented events. The need for applying
totally new OS policies and implementations motivated the authors of
Quest to create it from scratch to avoid dealing with complexity of the
existing large OS code (i.e. Linux) and not to go through conﬂicts with
traditional OS policies like UNIX. So, Quest has the freedom to make its
own design and implementation decisions. The most important resource
from Quest OS perspective is time, thus, it supports real-time tasks with
time-budget virtual CPUs separated from each other. Quest can support
both time-triggered conventional tasks and event (interrupt driven) tasks;
making it capable of scheduling both real-time and non real-time tasks.
3RTEMS is using a single address space for all tasks
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Figure 2.6: Quest Components [41]
Scheduling
The scheduling in Quest depends on a major concept of virtual CPUs.
A virtual CPU acts like a physical one for each thread, and it is assigned
a time-budget. VCPUS are implemented by sporadic servers. There are
two types of VCPUS: 1) Main VCPUs that are responsible of scheduling
threads and 2) IO VCPUs that handle IO operations associated with
interrupt behaviour. IO VCPUs make interrupt handlers act like tasks
in terms of scheduling and priorities. Figure 2.6, from Quest web-page
[41] illustrates the relations between VCPUs and other components of
Quest.
Virtualization
Quest makes direct use of Intel hardware virtualization to provide fault
tolerant system and to isolate each sandbox from one another, thus, it
prevents a crash in a sub-system from bringing the whole system down.
Quest-V is a multikernel OS (oﬀering virtualization features) on which
each core (or several ones) has its own kernel image and hardware re-
sources (sandbox) and can communicate with other cores on chip as
a distributed system. There is a monitor associated with each kernel
to help making migrations of applications easier by managing extended
page-table (EPT) technology. Monitors in Quest-V diﬀer from other
hypervisors in that each sandbox has its own monitor that helps boot-
strapping the kernels, and it eliminates the cost of VM-exits since the
kernel will resume right away. Other hypervisors use a single shared
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monitor for all of its VMs.
Quest-V and Linux
Quest-V can communicate with Linux via well-deﬁned communication
channels when Quest-V acts as a hypervisor and Linux as a guest OS.
Linux and other mixed criticality systems running on top of Quest-V
are separated from each other given that each of which runs on its own
sandbox. Thus, Linux applications and Quest real-time threads can run
on a single system. This is done by making use of hardware virtualization
features (Intel VT-x, VT-d, and EPT)
Communication
Quest uses shared memory channels managed by monitors to support
inter-sandbox communication. This makes it easy for real-time systems
and address space migration between sandboxes to exist. To notify a
sandbox with an arrival of a message, Quest uses inter-processor inter-
rupts (IPI) and polling on status bit for a given mailbox. For example
IPI is used for recovery purposes to tell other core(s) about a failure of
one core. The absence of a global clock and a global scheduler creates
new challenges including timing and thread migrations.
Migration
In Quest, both vCPUs and threads can be migrated between sand-
boxes for load balancing and performance purposes. IPI is used for
handshaking between sandboxes to initiate and notify about the end of
migration process. Monitors are used to map the source address space
to destination address space. Figure 2.7 from [68] shows the Quest
migration process.
The main issue with Quest is that it is privately maintained by Boston
University, and the open-source version is quite outdated. Also, Quest
heavily relies on Intel's hardware virtualization technologies, which makes
it very diﬃcult to port to another hardware architecture that does not
provide the same features. No formal manuals or speciﬁcations are pro-
vided for Quest.
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Figure 2.7: Migration Strategy [68]
2.3.5 Corey
Corey [30] is an exokernel OS designed for many-core systems and runs
on AMD Opteron and Intel Xeon. It tries to make access to shared data
structures as minimum as possible. For example, it bounds accesses to
shared memory to only one core. Also, Corey makes use of the many cores
to create a set of them only to handle some speciﬁc functions/threads.
It also sheds lights on the importance of giving applications the rights
to control data structures instead of leaving the kernel managing these
data structures exclusively without previous knowledge of its application
needs.
Corey Abstractions
Corey deﬁnes three abstractions to give applications the control over
(shared) data, given that they know their sharing needs. These abstrac-
tion are:
• Address Ranges
• Kernel Cores
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• Shares
Through address ranges, Corey makes it possible for applications
to specify some address ranges that can be private and others that are
shared for each core to avoid contention. If an address range is private,
no contention will happen and this will avoid TLB shootdowns. On
the other hand, if an address range is shared, the application speciﬁes
which cores use it, and contention is limited to these set of cores only.
Figure 2.8 explains how address space ranges work. MCS locks [72] are
implemented by Corey to handle synchronization and accesses to critical
sections. MCS locks have a great performance beneﬁt over Linux spin-
locks especially when the number of cores increases as shown in ﬁgure 2.9.
To avoid contention, applications can bind speciﬁc kernel functions
and data to a given core by making use of kernel cores. The core
exclusively has access to the code/data of a speciﬁc kernel function (e.g.
device drivers), and can communicate with other cores requesting a
service from it or delivering interrupts by a shared memory IPC. This
mechanism enables the kernel core to keep the code/data in its cache
and avoid TLB invalidation. No shared data structures or locks are
needed this way to access this device as only one core uses it.
Every application can create a share that tells the kernel which part of
its data can be shared with other cores. These shares make it possible to
separate private data from shared ones. For example an application may
share memory with other cores by having a shared mapping (page-table).
Corey is very good with hardware architectures that provide MMU
(including page-based management and TLBs), as well as caches. How-
ever, some of its abstractions might not work (well) on architectures that
lack such hardware units, or provide other alternative ways of memory
management.
2.3.6 FOS
Factored OS (FOS) [103] is a new kernel design developed by MIT. FOS
takes OS scalability as its highest prioirty challenge that drive its design
aspects. The authors argue that a new OS design is needed to work on
future 1000+ core chips, and propose FOS design and implementation as
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Figure 2.8: Example address space conﬁgurations for MapReduce exe-
cuting on two cores. Lines represent mappings. In this example a stack
is one page and results are three pages. [30]
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Figure 2.9: Time required to acquire and release a lock on a 16-core AMD
machine when varying number of cores contend for the lock. The two
lines show Linux kernel spin locks and MCS locks (on Corey). A spin
lock with one core takes about 11 nanoseconds; an MCS lock about 26
nanoseconds. [30]
a prototype.
FOS is inspired by scalable internet services and L4 microkernel
designs, and it tries to replace the traditional time-sharing-oriented OSs
(that were originally designed for uniprocessors) with a space-sharing
design where services are pinned to physical cores and requests are made
to these services from other application cores. By having exclusively
allocated cores for FOS kernel's services, it is possible to avoid contention
between applications and kernel services on resources like TLBs and
caches, thus, providing a scalable, high performance OS.
FOS has deﬁned its design principles as follows:
• Space multiplexing replaces time multiplexing.
• OS is factored into function speciﬁc services.
• Servers collaborate and communicate only via message passing.
• Servers are bound to speciﬁc cores.
• Applications communicate with servers via message passing.
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Figure 2.10: OS and application clients executing on the fos-microkernel
[103]
• Servers leverage ideas (caching, replication, spatial distribution,
lazy update) from internet servers.
The architecture of FOS is shown in ﬁgure 2.10. One major similarity
between FOS and multikernel design is that both embrace share-nothing
(no locks) and message passing techniques.
FOS design is inspired by microkernels design, and it provides sys-
tem services across one or more cores composing a ﬂeet that acts as a
distributed server (i.e. page allocator). Communication is done through
message passing technique, which is known for its scalability.
2.4 Operating Systems Design Issues on
Multi-core Architectures
With the rise of system on chips, and the need for custom IP cores that
are doing some speciﬁc functions better than others (for example, GPU
chips are better than general purpose CPUs with graphics), both SoC and
OSs (including device drivers), have to handle this new heterogeneous
architecture model. It is no longer valid that OSs assume to be designed
for single core, or even homogeneous multi-core architectures; they have
to evolve.
Heterogeneous architecture can be a mix of CPU, memories, GPU,
NoC, UART, accelerators, DMA, FPGA, etc. each with its speciﬁc func-
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tion. In fact, a heterogeneous system can be many CPU cores, with the
same ISA/ABI, but diﬀerent implementations, and features. An example
of this is the new RISC-V architecture, with one core acting as a master
with 3 levels of privileges that are able to run a complete OS, while there
are other application cores that can run only user-level code with only
one privilege level. Similarly, Parallella/Epiphany architecture that has
a master ARM core(s), as well as FPGA, memory, Epiphany cores (as
accelerators), and others.
The main problem is that for each new heterogeneous architecture,
the designers are inventing new mechanisms for addressing and com-
munication between such heterogeneous cores. Not only some of these
mechanisms need a lot of eﬀort from OSs developers to adapt (typically
device drivers), but also some of them may not be valid from some OS
design principles and implementation.
There are major aspects of a multi-core SoC to consider when devel-
oping OSs:
1. Memory System
2. Virtual/logical Address Spaces
3. Cache Coherency
4. Communication and addressing of other cores
5. IO
6. ISA
2.4.1 Memory System
Memory is a major component (if not the most important one) to con-
sider from both hardware and software sides. Physically, memory aspects
including manufacturing technology, number of ports, data rate, align-
ments, physical structure whether one piece of hardware or distributed
ones, protection, all of these aspects aﬀect how a complete system would
work. A single change to one of the previous attributes may lead to a
complete re-factoring of one (or more) OS components (e.g. memory
management library).
To give an example of how memory system aﬀects an OS, let's con-
sider memory protection. Traditionally, almost all of the current OSs
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(including the ones mentioned in this chapter) assume that there is a
memory management unit (MMU), which is page-based. This means
that the smallest memory unit to deal with when applying protection
attributes is of a page size, which is typically 4 KiB, and diﬀerent pro-
cessors can be conﬁgured to support diﬀerent sizes. Linux, seL4, Quest,
and Corey all assume this page-based protection, and they build on it
to provide other features like multi-tasking, virtualisation and demand
paging for instance. This MMU unit works ﬁne with monolithic and
microkernels, but does not do very well with embedded systems, RTOS,
and distributed memory systems. The main reasons are the overhead
of (n-level) address translation, TLB contentions (cenetralised hardware
structure and limited number of entries) and arbitrary page-size granu-
alities. 4 KiB is, in most architecure, the smallest page size, which might
be too big for embedded systems with low memory resources and require
n-level page tables translation.
RTEMS as an RTOS does need some form of memory protection for
some applications, but in most cases, it can not aﬀord the cost of trans-
lation and TLB contention that conventional MMU units enforce. More-
over, being deployed in embedded systems, the memory sizes would not
be as big as several gigabytes as with desktops. Hence, dealing with 4 KiB
page size as the smallest unit causes a huge waste of memory resources.
The previous two reasons result in RTEMS discarding using (dynamic)
memory protection to best use resources and meet its real-time require-
ments. Clearly, this aﬀects RTEMS design to exclude dynamic memory
management library for most of the supported architectures. Dynamic
memory management simply means that RTEMS provides support for
users to allocate and enfornce protection attributes on memory regions,
and update page tables in run-time. This process is costly as it needs to
take into consideration the overhead of updating page tables, consistency
of page table entries and TLBs (especially if working in SMP environ-
ment). Instead, RTEMS sets up page tables and MMU at start-up and
bootstrapping process with ﬁxed mapping and protection attributes.
Physically distributed memory introduces other challenges and
complexities but improves scalability. Hardware designers have to
provide a standard for this model whether to make it transparent
for programmers or to provide consistency models with new (atomic)
instructions and requires programmers to ensure data consistency
themselves to some extent. OS developers then have to re-design their
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shared data structures, taking into consideration the rate of contentions,
delays, consistency and correctness. Data structures include page tables,
which have to be consistent for the shared pages. Imagine 100 processors
are trying to update a shared page table/entry at the same time, this
is certainly a bottleneck especially when scalability is a requirement.
This is due to the fact that (shared) page tables are centralised shared
data structure. Because of this bottleneck, multikernel and FOS that
were discussed try to avoid any sharing. Even though, the multikernel
has to implement a form of software agreement protocol to maintain
consistency of globally-viewed data structures (if any).
2.4.2 Address Space
Address space is the range of addresses (physical or virtual) a process
or core can access. It is not only used for memory addressing, but it is
used for accessing other cores and memory mapped IO. According to
the core's register size, the maximum address space range is speciﬁed.
For example 32-bit cores can address up to 4 GiB. What range of
address space can be accessed by a given core/process is speciﬁed by a
memory management unit, or arbitrary during hardware manufacturing.
An address space can resemble logically adjacent addresses to access
physically scattered cores (including distributed memories). From the
OSs point of view, an address space term is correlated with a process,
giving it an access control to some amount of (virtual) memory, while
from IO devices and other cores, it is the range or physical addresses
they can access. Register sizes aﬀect the unit of allocation and pointers
used within OSs data structures and algorithms.
2.4.3 Cache Coherency
Cache coherency is another big issue for multi-core scalable SoCs.
Like with the previous example of 100 processors contending over a
page table/entry, the same issue occurs with cache lines, when the 100
processors are contending over this shared line. This is clear with [72]
that introduces scalable locks depending on cache coherency protocols.
While MCS locks introduced in this paper are currently considered
scalable, this may not be the case with 1000+ cores as FOS [103]
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predicts, and cache coherency would be a crucial barrier even with a
small amount of sharing. Multikernel uses MCS locks as well as cache
coherency hardware to communicate between cores. Similarly, RTEMS
tries to put some variables within data structures in diﬀerent cache lines
to avoid cache line contention and false sharing. This is clearly not
portable (or requires more eﬀort and introduces bugs) to architectures
that have diﬀerent cache line size, or no caches at all. Also caches have
been known to aﬀect predictability and determinism requirements.
OS performs context switches frequently between threads. Context
switches aﬀect the overall performance, and have many parameters. If
an OS supports memory protection and/or cache coherency, a context
switch will incur an overhead of changing the page-tables including
TLB faults, and cache invalidation operations. Although some hardware
solutions are provided, contention occurs due to the shared nature of
such structures. That is why FOS suggests to avoid context switches
(time sharing) and embrace locality principle; diﬀerent subsystems
(including the kernel) should only care about how to eﬃciently commu-
nicate and the performance of this communication (IPC) component.
Figure2.11, provides IPC performance costs of almost the same IPC
software implementation but on diﬀerent hardware implementations.
It is noticed that the hardware greatly aﬀects a crucial microkernel
component like IPC, ranging from 36 clock cycles for Pistachio IPC
on Itanium 2 processor up to 2000 clock cycles for Hazelnut IPC on
Pentium 4 processor.
2.4.4 Communication and Addressing
Communication between diﬀerent cores on a multi-core system is the
responsibility of OSs, all of the discussed kernel designs and implemen-
tations have a communication library or component. Communication is
tightly dependent on hardware features provided for communication like
inter-processor interrupts, shared memory, sending packets, etc. The
most widely used method of communication is using shared memory
mainly because it is simple, and does not require special instructions.
RTEMS for example uses shared memory for its multi-processing
support. However, shared memory does not do very well when it comes
47
Figure 2.11: IPC costs of diﬀerent L4 microkernel implementations on
hardware architcures [44]
to scalability and performance (taking into consideration the previous
issues of cache coherency and page-based memory management). From
the hardware side, communication media like buses, network on chips,
point to point communication, all aﬀect the way an OS on multi-core
chip works. Some of the OSs may choose to use one option to com-
municate between cores to meet its requirements such as simplicity
(shared memory), interrupts (performance), NoCs (scalability), buses,
etc. Communication is also a big concern for some kernel designs like
L4 microkernels because its IPC component acts as a main pillar of
its design and implementation. The ability to easily (and quickly)
communicate with other cores hugely aﬀects kernel design decisions and
implementations.
2.4.5 IO Management
IO management (in the form of device drivers), diﬀers between diﬀerent
kernel designs in the privileged mode they execute in. Monolithic kernels
like Linux include device drivers part of its components which adds
to code complexity and introduces more bugs to the kernel, while in
exokernel and microkernel designs, IO management is done by user-level
device drivers, thus, reducing kernel code size and bugs. Device drivers
have to coordinate sharing of its physical resources between diﬀerent
cores and processes. Also, there must be some sort of protection
between device drivers, applications, and the kernel itself. A device
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driver that can do DMA access can (intentionality or not) corrupt
other kernel data structures, or worse, hack the system. Quest-V
relies on Intel hardware virtualisation extensions to provide protection
between system components and IO. Also even with exokernel design,
the implementation should use such hardware security features from the
kernel, and leave policy to user-level. So, providing a simple standard
IO interface would aﬀect the OS design and implementation complexity,
scheduling, security and scalability.
2.4.6 Instruction Set Architecure
ISA is also another parameter for the design and implementation of OSs.
Except from RTEMS, all other discussed OSs assume there is at least
two levels of hardware privileged modes: user and kernel. Others may
provide more levels for use cases like hypervisors or machine emulation.
Privilege levels are a way to enforce protection on the CPU level
coordinating with an MMU unit for example to separate kernels and
applications, and providing security and integrity of a system. An ISA
that only provides one level of privilege modes would not be qualiﬁed to
run a typical OS like Linux or seL4.
In the next chapter, porting RTEMS as an RTOS to Parallella board
is discussed. Parallella has 16 Epiphany cores connected via a network
on chip and communicating with ARM, FPGA, local and global memory
(with no caches) cores. This gives us the opportunity to address the
issues of porting an OS that has been originally developed for single-core
system, to heterogeneous and SMP embedded system architecture like
Parallella, and what are the real-world issues of such a porting process
and what are the design issues from OSs point of view.
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Chapter 3
RTEMS on Epiphany multi-core
NoC
The goal of this chapter is to assess both a monolithic kernel like RTEMS
which is in its early stages of supporting SMP, and a new multi-core
architecture called Epiphany, and how they ﬁt together. Experience of re-
factoring RTEMS to work on a multi-core hardware with limited memory
resources is reported, as well as how the hardware architecture aﬀects the
design and implementation of RTEMS, trading oﬀ speed and size.
Three versions of RTEMS were implemented: 1) a squeezed, 2) SMP
and 3) factored version. The squeezed version tries to reduce RTEMS
size to less than 32 KiB to ﬁt into the fast local memories, thus keeping
it monolithic but removing most of its features. SMP version follows
the current ongoing development of RTEMS SMP support (and other
similar monolithic kernels), assuming shared memory, this design requires
using the very slow DRAM oﬀ-chip memory while preserving all RTEMS
features. So the trade-oﬀ is which parts of RTEMS needed to be placed
in local memories, and which in the shared external slow memory and
how this aﬀects the performance. The factored version tries to convert
RTEMS to something like a microkernel by placing the kernel and device
drivers on diﬀerent cores using only local memories to get the beneﬁt of
speed, and avoid using the slow shared memory. This attempt was not
practical due to the monolithic nature of RTEMS.
3.1 Epiphany Architecture
Epiphany [12] is a multi-core architecture developed by Adapteva. Cur-
rently, there are two variants of Epiphany chips: 16 and 64 core chips
50
(all 1GHz). The architecture is shown in Figure 3.1. Each CPU together
with a DMA unit and network controller forms a node, with nodes con-
nected via a 2D mesh networks, together with the memory. The memory,
CPU and tools are detailed in the remainder of this section.
Figure 3.1: Epiphany Architecture [12]
3.1.1 eCore CPU
The Epiphany core (eCore) [12] is a pipelined superscalar RISC CPU
designed for energy eﬃciency and real-time. It is a dual issue out of
order CPU, with a 9-port 64-word register ﬁle, IEEE-754 compliant FPU,
interrupt controller and memory protection unit.
The Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) has a variable length instruc-
tions (16 and/or 32 bit instructions). It is the responsibility of the com-
piler to decide which instruction version to generate depending on the
instruction being executed and its operands. This is done for eﬃcient
code density optimization. Instructions are categorized into: integer op-
erations, ﬂoating point operations, branching, load/store, data movement
(between registers and immediate values only) and program ﬂow instruc-
tions. Loads and stores are the only way to access the memory. There
are diﬀerent addressing modes that can be used with load/store instruc-
tions like displacement addressing, index-addressing, and post-modify
addressing.
Each eCore has an interrupt controller supporting nested and priori-
tized interrupts. 10 diﬀerent kinds of exceptions are supported, including
sync/start, memory protection faults, two timer interrupts, message in-
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terrupt, two DMA interrupts, WAND interrupts, user interrupts and
software exceptions (FP operations, invalid instruction and unaligned
memory access).
Timer interrupts can be used for scheduling purposes, eg. countdown
timer for deadline monitoring. Timers can also act as event counters 
eg. for proﬁling, idle clock cycles, number of valid integer instructions,
number of valid FP instructions, dual issue instructions, ﬁve diﬀerent
stalls events depending on the reason of the stall and ﬁnally mesh traﬃc
counter.
The WAND interrupt enables synchronization between workgroups
of CPUs  a multicast hardware synchronisation barrier. Once all CPUs
have set their WAND bits, then a WAND interrupt is generated to all
CPUs in the workgroup.
Message interrupts can be used as inter-processer interrupts in OSs,
and it is used in RTEMS part of the SMP implementation as shown in
later sections.
The Application Binary Interface (ABI) gives some rules for Epiphany
programmers that must be followed to guarantee a correct execution.
For example, it lists what general purpose registers must be saved by
the caller and others that the callee has to save during a subroutine call.
Also, the ABI states that the stack is growing down, and the start address
of the stack should be aligned to 8 bytes. Parameter passing, data types
and register usage are part of the ABI.
3.1.2 Memory Architecture
eCore have a 4GB address space consisting of 32-bit words (little en-
dian). Memory is accessed using bytes, halfwords, words or double-words
according to the load/store instruction type. Software exceptions are
caused by accessing a wrongly aligned address, eg. accessing a double
word using a store-double instruction with an address not aligned to 8
bytes.
Figure 3.2 shows a memory map for 64 core Epiphany chip. Each
core has its own local on-chip memory, whose address space ranges from
0x00000000 to 0x000FFFFF (1 MB). This is divided into 4 internal mem-
ory banks (each of which is 8 KB, with total space of 32 KB), memory
mapped registers and a reserved area. The address space of each core (in-
cluding memory mapped registers) can be globally accessed by all other
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Figure 3.2: Epiphany Global Address Map [12]
cores  a 12-bit core ID is used in the most signiﬁcant bits of the ad-
dress. Note that external memory is not shown, being above the local
space in the map, but dependent upon the actual architecture of the
board containing the Epiphany chip.
Memory accesses can be normal read/write memory transactions, or
access another core's registers (general and/or special purpose). Local
memory accesses take 0 cycles, and occur in strict memory order. Ac-
cessing non-local memory is relatively costly, with weak memory order.
3.1.3 eMesh network
Epiphany has a scalable 2D mesh network (eMesh) that connects each
node directly with its neighbours and operates at 1GHz frequency. Scal-
ability is limited by address space size, eg. 32-bit address space can ac-
commodate upto 4096 nodes (4 GB divided by 1 MB)  a 64-bit address
space can accommodate considerably more.
The eMesh network consists of three separate networks:
1. cMesh  serves on-chip write transactions;
2. rMesh  for non-blocking read transaction;
53
3. xMesh  serves oﬀ-chip memory transactions that go beyond the
chip.
On-chip writes are 8 bytes/cycle, with oﬀ-chip write transactions 16x
time slower. Hence, tasks should try to communicate with each other on
the same chip. The networks support direct interactions between cores
by simply writing to a core's global address space. The edges of the
network connect the chip to the outside world like another Epiphany
chip(s), shared external memory, IO peripherals, etc.
3.1.4 SDK Environment
Adapteva provides eSDK (Epiphany Software Development Kit), includ-
ing GNU tools, a multi-core GDB debugger and a functional simulator.
GCC is built with the newlib embedded library. The e-lib supplied library
acts as a run-time library, and includes interrupt handling, core identiﬁca-
tion, timer management, DMA handling and synchronization functions.
The e-hal library runs on the host side and provides functions to control
and communicate with Epiphany chip, loading programs, resetting the
system and conﬁguring/managing the behaviour of the Epiphany chip.
3.2 Porting RTEMS SMP to Epiphany
This section describes the main contribution of this chapter, namely the
port of RTEMS and RTEMS SMP support to the Epiphany architecture.
The target for the port is the Parallella board, model P1602 (for embed-
ded applications). This has an Epiphany 16-core CPU (E16G301), with
a Xilinx Zynq Dual-core ARM A9 XC7Z020 host CPU.
3.2.1 Toolchain and Parallela Board Setup
The toolchain used was GNU based, including binutils, GCC and GDB
(speciﬁc build epiphany-rtems4.11-*). GCC is built with an RTEMS
speciﬁc newlib, together with start-up code, system calls and BSPs for
bare board ports. We also note that recently there has been a new
approach developed for building the toolchain  RTEMS Source Builder
(RSB).
As noted above, the Parallela board contains both host (ARM) and
Epiphany CPUs. To utilise the board eﬀectively for experimentation
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Linux is installed on the ARM A9 as host. The RTEMS port (see next
section) can then be loaded onto Epiphany in two ways:
1. e-server  for debugging e-server opens ports for every Epiphany
core that a GDB client can attach to, load, execute and/or debug
programs on;
2. e-hal  the e-hal library API has functions to interact with the
Epiphany chip, including local memory access to load an RTEMS
image.
By default, the Linux image provided by Parallella community has all the
Epiphany tools installed along with e-hal and e-lib libraries, making
programming the Epiphany relatively straightforward.
3.2.2 RTEMS Porting Process
Porting a new CPU architecture (like Epiphany RISC CPU) to RTEMS
has to go through many stages. First, there must be a toolchain that
helps compiling/building RTEMS kernel and applications. RTEMS uses
GNU toolchain like binutils, GCC, and GDB. The resulting toolchain
programs should be something similar to epiphany-rtems4.11-*, where
Epiphany is the architecture, rtems4.11 is the RTEMS release number
and ﬁnally the name of the program (gcc, g++, obdjump, nm, etc). It
only diﬀers a little from the original elf toolchain used to build bare-metal
applications. Since RTEMS is targeting real-time embedded applications,
GCC is built with newlib as an embedded C library instead of GCC li-
brary. Bare-metal elf toolchains that use newlib library normally rely
on libgloss for providing start-up code, system calls and BSPs, however,
RTEMS does not use libgloss as it provides its own implementation of
the previously mentioned libgloss components. Recently, there has been
a new system that builds the toolchain (for supported RTEMS architec-
tures) from the source code; this system is called RTEMS Source Builder
(RSB), and it is now the main tool for building the toolchains.
RTEMS understands how the new architecture works internally via
the Abstract Binary Interface (ABI). A new directory with the name
of the architecture is added to cpukit/score/cpu; this directory con-
tains the deﬁnitions and/or conﬁgurations of the architecture required
by RTEMS. Key deﬁnitions are held in cpu.h  this deﬁnes which direc-
tion the stack grows, endianness, disabling/enabling interrupts, exception
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control, structures to be ﬁlled in and/or restored during context switches
or ISR handling. An assembly implementation for the thread context
initialisation, context switch and ISR handler are included. An RTEMS
port to a new architecture also requires a BSP, containing drivers for
console, clock, timers, DMA etc.
This part of the code would be shared with all BSPs that have this
CPU architecture. For example, there is only one ARM directory at
cpukit/score/cpu, while there are many ARM BSPs like real-view, Rasp-
berry Pi and Beagle boards that share the same code of ARM CPU.
The most important ﬁle at the newly added directory is cpu.h which
contains code deﬁning how RTEMS will deal with this architecture. It
deﬁnes which direction the stack grows, endianness, disabling/enabling
interrupts, exception control, structures to be ﬁlled in and/or restored
during context switches or ISR handling. Then an assembly implemen-
tation for the context switch and ISR handler should be provided, along
with some code that initializes thread contexts during task creation.
For a new architecture to be tested, there must be at least one BSP
for it. BSPs contain code for peripherals like console driver, clock driver,
timers, DMA, etc. The peripherals are part of the board that embeds
the CPU architecture. Diﬀerent BSPs can have diﬀerent peripherals.
As we will see later, there is a BSP called Parallella that depends on
the Epiphany RISC CPU architecture. There is a one-to-one mapping
between a hardware board and a software BSP as well as between a CPU
ISA and RTEMS cpukit/score/cpu.
An initial port of RTEMS to a new architecture can be tested by
using the functions in the BSP, with default test cases (eg. hello world,
ticker). This ensures that the new architecture port and BSP are ba-
sically correct. There are more than 500 tests that cover almost all of
the features that RTEMS may have. A new framework called RTEMS
Tester, is being developed for automating running all of the 500 tests
and get some results/numbers of passed/failed tests. Figure 3.3 gives an
overall ﬂowchart of the porting process of a new architecure to RTEMS
ecosystem.
3.2.3 Porting RTEMS to Epiphany
In this section, the steps of porting RTEMS to Epiphany with the Paral-
lella board as the ﬁrst BSP used for veriﬁcation are listed. The Parallella
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Figure 3.3: RTEMS Porting Process
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board model used is P1602 (for embedded applications) that has a Xil-
inx Zynq Dual-core ARM A9 XC7Z020 host processor, Epiphany 16-core
CPU (E16G301), 1 GB DDR3, and other peripherals.
First, a Linux distribution has to be installed on the Zynq chip which
is provided by Parallella community and can be found on their website
with detailed instructions how to burn the Linux image to the SD card
and run it. The RTEMS executable can then run on the Epiphany chip
from Linux on the Zynq chip. There are two ways to load/run RTEMS
on the Epiphany chip, one way can be used for debugging using e-server
that opens ports for every Epiphany core that a GDB client can attach
to, load, execute and/or debug programs at, and the other way is to
use the e-hal library API that has a lot of functions to do almost every
vital operation with the Epiphany chip. Both methods can be used to
run RTEMS, but C programs that use e-hal to load and manage/monitor
RTEMS are more eﬃcient and have more control. For example, it's easier
to load a single RTEMS image to the 16 Epiphany cores and start them
with a single line of code rather than opening 16 GDB terminal clients for
each core (other than the e-server). By default, the Linux image provided
by Parallella community has all the Epiphany tools installed along with
e-hal and e-lib libraries, so it's ready for users to start programming
Epiphany once they run Linux.
As discussed earlier, a toolchain must exist to build programs for our
targetEpiphany. Almost any UNIX platform can be used to build the
toolchain. Linux was used during the porting process. The toolchain
includes binutils, newlib and GCC. Except for binutils, all other tools (in
source code format) are checked out from the head repositories. binutils
is cloned from Adapteva GitHub repository. A few set of patches has been
applied to all of the previous sources to make them recognize RTEMS at
the stage of conﬁguring and building these tools. The conﬁguration line
for these tools should have epiphany-rtems4.11 at a target option. The
resulting set of tools are all preﬁxed with epiphany-rtems4.11-* (which
may be changed in future RTEMS releases). GCC is built with newlib
discarding all libgloss code.
cpu.h
cpu.h (in cpukit/score/cpu/epiphany) contains almost all of the im-
portant machine deﬁnitions. In terms of Epiphany the important char-
acteristics are:
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• stack  Epiphany (eCore) stacks grown down, and are initialised at
a high address.
• interrupts  disable and enable functions are provided in that ﬁle,
making use of gid and gie Epiphany assembly instructions for
global interrupt disable and enable respectively.
• thread context  data structure deﬁned to hold all eCore context
for context switching and ISR handling.
A related ﬁle (epiphany-utility.h) contains some important deﬁnitions
for registers, IO memory mapped addresses and for mapping Epiphany
core IDs to RTEMS CPU IDs and vice versa, as well as functions to get
the currently executing core ID.
Context Switch and Interrupts
Context switch code is located in epiphany-context-switch.S,
with epiphany-exception-handler.S containing the code for the
ISR_Handler assembly function which is the core of interrupt handling.
Interrupt handling proceeds in the following manner:
1. Space is reserved in the interrupted task stack to save a
CPU_Exception_frame context. Currently all of the 64 general
purpose registers are saved along with status, config and iret
special registers.
2. If SMP is enabled, another is_executing boolean variable has to be
added to the context control structure to indicate whether the heir
(to-be-restored) thread is executing on another processor or not,
and wait until it no longer executes on another processor, then sets
it. This process must be done as an atomic operation.
3. Increment nesting level and disable thread dispatching. At this
point, a decision must be made if it is needed to switch the stack
to RTEMS software interrupt stack depending on the nesting level.
4. Jump to the user C handler. The user C handler can be installed
dynamically. NB there are default handlers that are set by the BSP
at the start-up code.
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5. After returning from the C handler, a check to see if a thread dis-
patch is necessary is made, and if so, it jumps to _Thread_Dispatch
to select a higher priority thread.
6. The ﬁnal action is to restore the context of, and jump to, the next
thread by returning from the interrupt.
A context switch is essentially the same as the above, except that it does
not involve executing of an interrupt handler.
Drivers
Three other drivers are required for the port:
1. Clock driver  required for scheduling purposes. This in-
cludes epiphany_clock_initialize, epiphany_clock_at_tick,
and epiphany_clock_handler_install. Within this driver
epiphany_clock_initialize installs RTEMS Clock_isr function
address at corresponding timer0 entry of the C handlers vector ta-
ble, then it sets up the timer0 registers and starts it. Function
epiphany_clock_at_tick is called from Clock_isr at every clock
interrupt occurrence and it resets the timer0 value and runs it
again.
2. Console driver  this driver is a way to print out data. This driver
uses a shared-memory approach, communicating to Linux running
on the ARM host via a shared buﬀer (and control bits) with Linux
polling and printing when data is available to print out.
3. Timer benchmark driver  helps with proﬁling and timing perfor-
mance analysis.
3.2.4 RTEMS SMP Implementation on Epiphany
Implementing RTEMS SMP on Epiphany requires initially a way to con-
vert Epiphany core IDs, to RTEMS linear IDs. Epiphany uses 12-bit IDs
 6-bits for column and 6-bits for row. For example, a core on the 32nd
row and the 8th column has an ID of 0x808. Conversion of Epiphany
IDs to RTEMS linear IDs is achieved using (for the 16 core chip) 1:
1Alternatively a more expensive switch statement could be used, but was felt not
to be scalable as the number of cores increases.
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movfs r17, coreid
mov r19, #0x003
mov r20, #0x0F0
and r19, r17, r19
and r20, r17, r20
lsr r20, r20, #4
add r17, r19, r20
This is used within start.S to decide whether the executing core is
the boot CPU and to index _Per_CPU_Information[] table to get the
proper stack address for the secondary processor(s). Within the port,
core ID 0x808 (row 32 and columns 8) is mapped to RTEMS CPU ID 0.
The ISR_Handler also uses the above to index _Per_CPU_Information[]
table with the current RTEMS CPU ID. The _Per_CPU_Information
entry holds data like stacks, interrupt level, and dispatching control.
Within cpukit/score/cpu/epiphany the new epiphany-atomic.c
ﬁle is added  NB currently no available GCC atomic operations for
Epiphany. Within epiphany-atomic.c a fetch-and-increment operation
on a static global variable (the one lock) is implemented.
Within cpukit/score/cpu/epiphany ﬁle epiphany-smp.c
holds code for low-level inter-CPU interrupts. Here
_Epiphany_Send_interrupt takes the Epiphany core ID and the
type of interrupt as arguments to construct the global address of the
targeted core's ILATS register (used to set interrupts for a core) and set
the corresponding bit according to the type of the interrupt. Function
_Epiphany_Send_interrupt calls _CPU_SMP_Send_interrupt with an
interrupt type of SMP_MESSAGE which maps to the message interrupt.
At the BSP layer, a new bspsmp.c ﬁle is added that con-
tains bsp_start_on_secondary_processor function which is
called from start.S if the CPU is a secondary one. This func-
tion installs bsp_inter_processor_interrupt (that calls the
generic _SMP_Inter_processor_interrupt_handler function)
at the indirect interrupt vector table for this secondary core,
and disables interrupts before changing its state to become
PER_CPU_STATE_READY_TO_START_MULTITASKING and waiting for
the boot processor to give it the permission to start.
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Figure 3.4: RTEMS on Epiphany Timing and Memory Analysis. Whole
RTEMS column is the squeezed version where there is no use of the
external shared memory. All RTEMS instances are placed in a local
memory on each core. All of the other columns are of the SMP version
where some parts of each RTEMS instance (mentioned in the column's
title) are placed in each core's local memory, and the remaining (shared)
parts are placed in the shared external DRAM memory. Execution time
is given in cycles.
3.3 Performance Analysis of RTEMS port on
Epiphany
In this section we give timing measurements of context switch, interrupt
handling and some scheduling functions for the squeezed and SMP ver-
sions. The squeezed version only uses local memories, while SMP version
uses both local and external shared memories. These are measured for
diﬀerent code placement strategies  ie. as the Epiphany core local mem-
ory is limited to 32Kb, we have to allocate code (and buﬀers etc.) across
local and external memory, with the timing dependent upon allocation.
Clearly, if more RTEMS is placed into local memory, then there is less
space for application code, and vice versa  although the trade-oﬀ for
memory allocation between RTEMS and the application remain for fu-
ture work.
Figure 3.4 shows the timings (in cycles) for diﬀerent allocations of
RTEMS functionality to memory:
• Whole RTEMS (squeezed version)  all RTEMS placed into local
memory (via source code and compiler optimisation for space).
• Nothing local (SMP version)  only start code and interrupt vectors
placed into local memory.
• ISR_Handler + Stack (SMP version)  only start code, interrupt
vectors, ISR_Handler and stack in local memory.
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• ISR_Handler (SMP version)  only start code, interrupt vectors
andISR_Handler in local memory.
• Context Switch + Buﬀers (SMP version)  only start code, context
switch and context buﬀers in local memory.
• Context Switch (SMP version)  only start code and context switch
in local memory.
As can be seen in the tables, the fastest is for all of RTEMS to be placed
in local memory, although this corresponds to the minimum amount of
free memory for applications2.
As mentioned previously, one Epiphany core local memory is only
32KB. We worked on two main versions of RTEMS: normal version and
squeezed version. The normal version places only the start code (.start
section) that is responsible for low-level initialization and interrupt hooks,
in local memory and all other code sections are placed on external mem-
ory including the stack, heap, .text and .data sections. The squeezed
version aggressively reduces the whole RTEMS size to ﬁt into less than
32KB local memory by means of compiler's optimization ﬂags and source
code hacking. As you may have guessed, the squeezed version is much
more faster than the normal one.
As you can see in ﬁgure3.4, the squeezed version that places the whole
RTEMS in a local memory is extremely fast compared to other versions.
We note that since Clock_isr (and its call tree) is a large piece of
kernel code, execution time rises signiﬁcantly when not in local memory
(see ﬁgure3.4)  hence it appears a good trade-oﬀ to place Clock_isr and
ISR_handler in local memory, as they are executed frequently every 10ms
to handle the default clock interrupt in RTEMS. As shown in ﬁgure3.4
placing the interrupt stack in local memory also improves execution time.
Table2 in ﬁgure3.4 shows context switch and dispatch timings.
_Thread_Dispatch is called from ISR_Handler if a new higher prior-
ity task has been scheduled (eg. potentially called from Clock_isr for
periodic thread release), and eventually calls _Context_Switch. Note
that timings for _Context_Switch and _Thread_Dispatch are marked
as N/A in the table, as they are essentially the same as nothing lo-
cal (unless the whole of RTEMS is in local memory)  this is due to
2Note that Adapteva are considering extending local memory to 64Kbytes for
future eCore and Epiphany architectures.
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_Thread_Dispatch calling a lot of other routines which are in external
memory.
Timings for SMP features, including message passing and inter-CPU
interrupts remain for future work. Note that current observations suggest
inter-core interrupt latency is almost the same as with ISR_Handler plus
C user SMP handler.
3.4 Conclusions
Many core chips have become popular during the last decade, trending to-
wards massive multi-core / NoC architectures [103]. To respond, RTOSs
have to be re-designed to scale alongside the architecture scaling, noting
that synchronization between CPUs becoming increasingly important.
This chapter has considered the porting of a conventional monolithic
RTOS design, namely RTEMS, to the Epiphany NoC architecture. This
architecture has only limited local memory, hence the issue of how much
of the RTOS can be placed into local memory, rather than external mem-
ory, is important. It is noted that the relative costs of accessing external
memory to local memory suggest that getting the allocation of RTOS
to local and external memory is crucial to overall system performance.
Further investigation of this balance is required, with only basic consid-
eration (of key functionality) given in the chapter. One key conclusion
though of this chapter is that placing the whole of RTEMS into local
memory is not practical, for 32 KiB local memories.
Further work will investigate the true costs of SMP communication
(via shared memory and inter-CPU interrupts). We noted that initial
observations suggested that RTEMS SMP is eﬃcient, although this needs
to be quantiﬁed fully.
To conclude the experience of porting RTEMS to Epiphany and re-
lated RTEMS design decisions, the issue points mentioned in section 2.4
are discussed here.
First, the most important observation gained from this experience is
the memory structure within a multi-core chip. OSs have a lot of data
structures, and they need to be laid out and accessed eﬃciently in a
scalable way. This is the responsibility of both kernel developers and
hardware designers. The Epiphany architecture has two extreme types
of memories: fast small local memories, and slow big external memory.
Clearly with a considerable eﬀort only on the kernel structure part, it
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is not enough to get the best use of such architecture mainly because of
its memory structure. The hardware has to get involved and amended
to help achieving an overall optimal multi-core system. The good as-
pect about memory system in Epiphany (according to RTEMS), is that
there is no MMU unit. Thus, the port does not have to do any static
initialisation of MMU, or suﬀer from translation, TLB or fragmentation
overheads. However, a slightly more sophisticated OS like seL4 would not
simply work there, because of its needs to memory protection, privilege
levels and more memory footprint. The lack of cache units was also a big
win from RTEMS perspective to maintain its predictability requirements
and simple code base. Not to mention the scalability boost gained by
getting rid of non-scalable caches.
Second, Epiphany is very good when it comes to its address space
model. From the Epiphany chip, every core and IO device can be simply
accessed using addresses. This greatly simpliﬁes how diﬀerent (hetero-
geneous) cores communicate with each other. Such a ﬂat address space
enabled the port to simulate a console driver using only shared memory.
There was a ﬁnal attempt to get RTEMS working on only local mem-
ories (16 * 32 KiB) by re-designing it in a microkernel way with only one
kernel instance on one core, and other device drivers and applications on
other cores. Unfortunately this was not applicable for the following rea-
sons: 1) Run-time-wise, RTEMS is inherently a monolithic kernel, there
is no IPC layer like with microkernels between its diﬀerent subsystems,
2) the result of the building process of RTEMS is a single image (even on
SMP it assumes a shared memory address space) containing the kernel,
drivers, and applications, so it was not even possible to split up its com-
ponents during the building process, 3) Epiphany architecture does not
provide any protection/isolation between cores and IO, so maintaining
security on such platform is an open issue.
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Chapter 4
seL4 microkernel on RISC-V
Hardware Architecture
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the hardware requirements
to run a more sophisticated OS (than RTEMS) like seL4 microkernel,
which needs to enforce security, simplicity and scalability as its design
principles. seL4 requires more memory footprint, hardware protection
features and IPC implementation layer, thus Epiphany was not a suitable
hardware platform candidate. RISC-V ISA is a new open-source hard-
ware speciﬁcation, which provides the previous hardware requirements
to run seL4 microkernel. Moreover, RISC-V speciﬁcation stands out
between other hardware architectures for being completely open-source
and deﬁning how an implementation may add new hardware features in
a standard way according to its requirements. This allows implementing
new research ideas on both OS and hardware architectures, not being
restricted by one another.
Because of its simplicity and minimality, seL4 (as a microkernel) can
act as a hypervisor that can be quickly ported to new (research) hard-
ware architectures, while application layer can still be (relatively) hard-
ware agnostic and compatible. Application layer may involve a complete
monolithic server (like L4 Linux) with a very little eﬀort compared to
porting Linux itself to a new (perhaps exotic) hardware architecture.
This way, new hardware features can be assessed (i.e new hardware se-
curity features or memory management mechanisms) without having to
re-factor thousands (or even millions) lines of code of aﬀected OS com-
ponents (like memory management) while preserving application-level
compatibility, and getting the advantage of reusing a lot of other con-
ventional/legacy applications including monolithic kernels and their rich
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device drivers repositories.
4.1 Introduction
In order to investigate new solutions in both hardware and software
for the previous issues, seL4 microkernel has been ported to RISC-V
hardware architecture. Both are completely open-source, allowing us
to modify and add new features ﬂexibly. In this chapter, the RISC-V
architecture is introduced as well as the porting process of seL4 micro-
kernel to it. The focus is on assessing seL4 (as a microkernel design) and
RISC-V (as a new open-source ISA) features and how they ﬁt together.
No performance analysis is done for some reasons: 1) RISC-V is an
ISA speciﬁcation rather than an implementation, the chapter is mostly
concerned with the ISA only, 2) because RISC-V is open-source, diﬀerent
implementations can trade-oﬀ and add their own features according to
their requirements (power eﬃciency, size, performance, scalability, etc),
3) because RISC-V is new, few (mature) open-source implementations
actually exist currently, the most reliable ones are Spike simulator and
FPGA-based Rocket Core which were used while porting seL4 and are
not quite feasible to get performance analysis for.
The reason for choosing seL4 is that it is currently considered the
state-of-art microkernel, that is simple, powerful and formally veriﬁed
(has no bugs). Moreover, being a microkernel, it has to deal with mem-
ory management (MMU), and its subsystems communicate via message
passing channels. This allow us to target broader challenges of memory
management and protection as well as scalability, and such issues could
not be addressed within RTEMS that only works in privilege (kernel)
mode with no notion of user/kernel levels, and hence all service invoca-
tions are just direct function calls with passing parameters and sharing
memory rather than message-passing-oriented. Indeed, this is a current
bottleneck for RTEMS SMP support. Furthermore, RTEMS barely pro-
vides (dynamic) memory protection and isolation between threads. So,
seL4 acts as an optimal OS for NoC-based SoC (given that it is inherently
using hardware message passing), allowing us to address the memory pro-
tection challenges within NoC/SoC.
RISC-V [101] is a new open-source Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)
designed by UC Berkeley. It is mainly introduced for educational and
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research purposes, and to avoid the patent issues involved with commer-
cial processors like Intel, ARM and MIPS. Giving that RISC-V is just
an architecture speciﬁcation, it allows any one to have their own hard-
ware (microarchitecture) implementation, but they all must comply to
the original ISA speciﬁcation. That is, an implementation can be con-
cerned with power consumption, code density, scalability, area or any
other trade-oﬀs.
Currently there are some RISC-V cores implemented by diﬀerent par-
ties, some of them are open-source and others are not. In the following
sections, RISC-V user and privilege level speciﬁcations are introduced.
4.2 RISC-V User-Level ISA - Version 2.0
[101]
RISC-V ISA is divided into base integer and extension ISA. The base
integer is mandatory for any RISC-V implementation, and it acts as the
core of the ISA. There are two versions of the RISC-V base integer ISA:
32 and 64 bit, with the feasibility of future 128 bit ISA. These are called
RV32I, RV64I and RV128I versions. An implementation can support
RV32I or RV64I or both of them.
Beyond the base integer ISA, there could be standard, but optional,
extensions like multiplication and ﬂoating point units. There is a separate
Privilege-mode ISA speciﬁcation for OSs discussed later. The user-level
ISA was basically designed to be modular and simple, and not to rely on
any customized hardware features like caches, in/out-of-order execution,
thus, allowing an implementation to take place with its own extensions
if required.
The base ISA instruction encoding is ﬁxed 32-bit length, with the
possibility of adding variable length instructions. There is also a 16-bit
compressed ISA but it is optional. In the following section, 32-bit ISA is
described.
4.2.1 32-bit RISC-V Base Integer ISA
RV32I ISA is a load-store architecture that has 32 registers (x0-x31).
It is little-endian and assumes byte-addressable memory. Instruction
encodings are divided up into categories as seen in ﬁgure 4.1
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Figure 4.1: RISC-V RV32I Instruction Encoding [101]
R-type encodes instructions that operate on registers and store the
result in a register also. Registers' addresses are ﬁxed across diﬀerent
instruction encodings. Examples of R-type instructions are: add, and,
or, xor, all with three operands (rs1, rs2 and rd).
I-type encodes instructions that has one of its source operands in a
register (rs1) and the other is an immediate encoded part of the instruc-
tion taking a room of 12 bits. To ease sign extension decoding, MSB of
any immediate encoding is always placed in instruction[31] bit. Examples
of I-type instructions are: addi, andi, xori, and also has three operands
with rs2 replaced with an immediate value.
S-type instructions are usually used for encoding conditional branch
instructions with rs1 and rs2 source operands to be compared and 12-bit
immediate as the branch signed oﬀset giving a range of 4 KiB from the
current pc in either direction.
Finally, U-type instruction encodes unconditional jumps with 20-bit
signed oﬀset from pc with 1 MiB range.
Besides the previous instructions, there is a fence instruction to allow
the programmer to manage concurrency within a relaxed memory model.
Concurrency can take place between concurrent RISC-V threads or IO
devices for example.
4.2.2 System Instructions
There are system instructions used to change the RISC-V mode from
user-level to privilege-level to request a service from an OS for example.
ECALL and EBREAK are used for trapping and debugging purposes.
Furthermore, to help with scheduling and proﬁling, there are system
instructions to handle cycle and time counters.
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4.3 RISC-V Privilege-level ISA
RISC-V Privilege-level ISA involves every state and operation that are
beyond User-Level ISA and typically provides the features for an OS to
execute. At the time of writing this thesis, the RISC-V privilege-level
speciﬁcation is in a draft [100] form that will most likely change in the
future. The components that are involved part of seL4 port are discussed
here.
4.3.1 RISC-V Privilege Modes
There are currently four RISC-V privilege modes: user, supervisor, hy-
pervisor and machine modes. Machine mode is the highest privilege level,
giving access to all hardware resources, and it is mandatory and must
be implemented in any RISC-V compliant core, while the others are op-
tional. To provide applications with protection, a minimal RISC-V core
would support both user and machine modes. Supervisor mode provides
page-based protection as most OSs expect. Hypervisor mode helps with
virtualisation, however it is not documented nor it has been implemented
yet. In the following section machine and supervisor modes are discussed
in more details.
RISC-V Machine Mode
Machine mode is the highest RISC-V privilege mode and is the ﬁrst mode
to be entered on power reset. An application executing in machine mode
can access any register state, including lower privilege registers. Machine
mode registers are preﬁxed with m letter.
mcpuid register gives information about the features the underlying
RISC-V provides like which ISA does it provide (RV32I, RV64I or any
other extensions). It also speciﬁes which privilege modes are there part
of this hardware implementation.
Machine Status Register mstatus is the most important register in
Machine mode that controls the RISC-V core and monitors its behaviour.
It manipulates interrupts, privilege modes, virtualisation management
and disabling/enabling other features like ﬂoating point operations.
The 5-bits VM entry within the mstatus register represents how vir-
tualisation management is done during the current execution time. The
diﬀerent VM management modes are shown in ﬁgure 4.2
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Figure 4.2: Encoding of virtualization management ﬁeld VM[4:0]. [100]
M, S and U refer to Machine, Supervisor and User modes respectively.
Mbare mode in entered on reset with no protection or translation.
Diﬀerent exceptions and interrupts can occur in machine mode and
RISC-V recognizes the cause of the exception by reading the mcause
register. Figure 4.3 shows diﬀerent exception types.
RISC-V Supervisor Mode
Supervisor mode is the proper mode that contemporary Unix-based OSs
and microkernels like seL4 expect. It provides page-based translation
and protection by a memory management unit (MMU) that involves
page tables and entries. There are few page-based modes each with its
page (table) and address space granularity.
Sv32 provides a 32-bit address space covering 4 GiB, with both 4
MiB mega pages and 4 KiB pages granularity laid out in a one or two
level page tables respectively. It works with RV32 ISA. Sv32 system is
discussed here as seL4 port has been ported for it, and also other Sv39
and Sv48 systems follow the same terminology.
The formats of virtual/physical addresses as well as page table entries
are shown in ﬁgures 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. VPN is 20-bit virtual page number
that is translated to 22-bit Physical Page Number (PPN). The page oﬀset
stays ﬁxed and is not translated.
V bit refers to a valid Page Table Entry (PTE) when set. R and D
bits specify whether the corresponding page has been read or modiﬁed
(dirty), and these might be managed/used by the OS. Type bits encode
the access control attributes of the page and whether it is a leaf PTE or
a pointer to the next page table level. Possible PTE types are provided
in ﬁgure 4.7
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Figure 4.3: Exception Codes [100]
Figure 4.4: Sv32 Virtual Address Format [100]
Figure 4.5: Sv32 Physical Address Format [100]
Figure 4.6: Sv32 Page Table Entry Format [100]
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Figure 4.7: Sv32 Page Table Entry Type Encodings [100]
Figure 4.8 is a ﬂowchart demonstrating how page translation and
protection is done in Sv32 mode. sptbr register holds the address of the
ﬁrst-level page table (as known as page directory).
Similarly Sv39 and Sv48 work with RV64 ISA, providing 39-bit and
48-bit virtual address space respectively, with three level page tables.
4.4 seL4 on RISC-V
Porting seL4 to RISC-V requires a knowledge of both seL4 microkernel
and RISC-V design/implementation. The project succeeded to perform
a complete port of seL4 microkernel that enables running a simple OS
on top of it. Currently it can run on Sv32/RV32, Sv39/RV64 on both
Spike (the main RISC-V simulator), and also on Rocket Chip (FPGA).
There have been some implementation trade-oﬀs regarding the project,
described below.
4.4.1 seL4/RISC-V Port Details and Trade-oﬀs
32-bit or 64-bit? Both! seL4 only supports 32-bit targets currently,
on the other hand, RISC-V has been focusing on 64-bit implementations
right from the start with a little support for 32-bit; UC Berkeley team
has only 64-bit Rocket chip and there is no 32-bit hardware imple-
mentation so far (except for some simple educational repos). Luckily,
Spike has recently supported 32-bit mode (with a new isa ﬂag). It is
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Figure 4.8: Sv32 Page Translation Process.
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easier to port seL4 for 32-bit architecture trying to follow/imitate the
existing ARM/IA-32 ports. A complete 64-bit implementation would
be more challenging as most of the seL4 data structures and scripts
assume 32-bit environment. The port successfully runs on Spike/RV32
simulator. In order enable it running on real hardware (64-bit Rocket
Chip), the page-tables and memory management related data structures
were laid out to comply with Sv39/RV64 system. All other instructions
and data structures are kept in 32-bit formats as seL4 was originally
designed for.
Working in which mode?
The latest privileged speciﬁcation introduces 4 modes that RISC-V soft-
ware can run in. Conceptually, seL4 might run in any of the three priv-
ileged modes separately, or even two or three of them simultaneously.
Figure 4.9 shows the possible seL4, guest OSs and applications conﬁgu-
rations regarding to which modes they can run at.
The number of which modes to run seL4 microkernel in was narrowed
down to two by the fact that there is no hypervisor implementation
yet. These two modes are: machine (M-mode), and supervisor (S-mode)
modes. The M-mode supports physical access control and Base-and-
Bounds checking, i.e. no mapping or address translation, only S-mode
does. seL4 microkernel on the other hand expects that it would run in
an address-translation-based mode, and would map its kernel image, IPC
buﬀers, bootframe and other areas of memory during bootstrap. So we
followed the current seL4 ports to work in S-Mode.
Loading the image(s) and mapping pages
The bare seL4 system basically consists of: 1) the kernel image, 2) ap-
plications. Current ARM and IA-32 seL4 ports diﬀer in the way they
load the kernel image and applications. Since IA-32 port can boot in
multikernel mode, it loads the images in way similar to grub. So the
kernel is the ﬁrst part that takes control of the physical resources, and it
loads/maps the application images itself. The ARM port behaves diﬀer-
ently in that it archives the kernel and application images in cpio format.
There is a separate elﬂoader tool that reads the ELF images from the
cpio archive, loads it to the available physically-adjacent memory, sets up
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the VM environment and ﬁnally maps the ELF images according to their
ELF's section VMAs. Hence, the elﬂoader is the ﬁrst to take control of
the physical resources, and then it passes control to the kernel (which
works in a VM environment right from the start) with some information
passed to it about the loading addresses of the kernel image itself and
the user image(s). The ﬁnal image for the seL4/ARM system then con-
tains: 1) elﬂoader tool, 2) libelf, 3) libcpio, 4) kernel image and 5) user
applications. We followed the ARM port as it is more hardware agnostic,
and as a start the RISC-V wouldn't need to support multikernel mode.
Other seL4 components involved
seL4 microkernel itself needs other tools and libraries to work with. Such
tools are elﬂoader, building/conﬁguration systems and other user-space
utility libraries. The port involved working on:
libmuslc: libelf depends on libmuslc. I performed a very basic port
of musl c library to RISC-V architecture, enough to build it successfully
and produce the .a library.
libelf: This one is portable and architecture-independent. It has to
be included part of the elf loading process.
libcpio: like libelf, libcpio is also architecture-independent and is
used to read the cpio archive containing the kernel image and user images.
elﬂoader: This tool is developed by seL4 team for the ARM port, I
had to port it to RISC-V. It has to work in M-mode and it is acting as
riscv-pk, that is, any system calls from seL4 microkernel are redirected
to elﬂoader code, which handles it and returns (apart from its main
purpose which is loading the kernel/user images). elﬂoader currently
only supports write and exit system calls (to be able to get some printf
output and exit the spike simulator).
seL4 microkernel: The project is mainly about the seL4 microker-
nel. The port basically followed ARM port and even a lot of code is
copied from it. seL4 microkernel runs in S-mode right from the start
as mentioned previously. Some architecture-level capability data struc-
tures had to be modiﬁed according to the RISC-V ISA, and the low-level
RISC-V VM handling code is now implemented to map the kernel image,
kernel frames, initial task and user images properly.
Build system: The build system for seL4 projects is the Linux
Kconﬁg/Kbuild build system. The existing Kconﬁg/Kbuild ﬁles had
to be modiﬁed to allocate a new entry for RISC-V architecture with
77
a new Spike platform. New riscv defconﬁg, project-riscv.mk, makeﬁles
and other ﬁles were added to enable building a complete seL4/RISC-V
system (elﬂoader, libcpio, libelf, seL4 mircokernel and user image) like
in seL4tests project and other seL4 projects.
4.4.2 Simple Operating System Running on seL4
seL4 microkernel runs in privilege mode while device drivers and appli-
cations run in user-mode. To prove the port is reliable, and to put new
message passing and scalability issues under consideration, an interesting
use-case such as running an OS on top of seL4 would be useful. This also
might allow heterogeneous OSs to run on heterogeneous cores, with seL4
acting as a hypervisor, and this is an active area of both research and
industrial development currently.
What is SOS
Simple Operating System (SOS) is a server running on top of the seL4
microkernel. The SOS server is expected to provide a speciﬁed system
call interface to its clients (Speciﬁed in libs/libsos/include/sos.h). SOS is
used part of an advanced OS course oﬀered by University of New South
Wales and currently only runs on Sabre Lite ARM-based board, seL4
on RISC-V can be considered the second supported platform for SOS,
and the ﬁrst all-open-source seL4 system, providing that seL4 (and its
components), RISC-V ISA, Spike simulator (and Rocket-Chip on FPGA)
are all open-source. The SOS framework is described in ﬁgure 4.10.
The components shown in the ﬁgure are:
Harware: The hardware described in our case is the RISC-V plat-
form.
seL4 microkernel: This is the seL4 RISC-V port of the kernel (and
the third port after IA-32 and ARM). It provides the functionalities
needed to run our SOS project in the form of memory management,
scheduling, IPC, etc.
SOS: a stub OS running on top of seL4 microkernel. It is intended to
be developed and enhanced by students and/or people who are interested
to learn about seL4. SOS initializes a synchronous endpoint capability
for its clients/applications to use for communication. Interrupts are de-
livered using an asynchronous endpoint (seL4 has two types of endpoint
capability: synchronous and asynchronous).
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Figure 4.10: SOS Framework
tty test: It serves as a simple application running on top of SOS
that simply prints out a hello word message. The application level would
need to issue system calls to SOS using the seL4 endpoint capabilities.
An example of such a system call is tty test application requesting (from
SOS) some data to be printed out. SOS on the other hand monitors the
system call requests from its clients (using seL4Wait system call), serves
it, and sends replies.
What is needed to support running SOS
Other than the seL4 microkernel internals, almost all of the current seL4
user-level libraries had to be supported to build SOS and its applications.
To be able to build/run SOS, the following components are involved:
seL4 microkernel: it now supports memory management capa-
bilities, context switch, traps from user applications, and a lot more
architecture-dependent functions were implemented.
libseL4: This is the user-level library for applications to deal with
seL4 microkernel via system calls. It deﬁnes the format of the system
calls, kernel objects deﬁnitions, user-level context and it exposes them
all to the user.
libmuslc: The C library that seL4 and its libraries depend on. It
has been ported to RISC-V part of this project, and now it is working
pretty ﬁne as expected.
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libsel4muslcsys: A minimal muslc implementation for the root task
to bootstrap, it provides stdio related system call handlers and it is part
of the bootstrap procedure of the root task, deﬁning the system call table
and entry point for muslc-based applications.
libplatsupport: Some platform related functions (BSP) for seL4
supported platforms. For example serial driver initialization and console
driver functions for a given board are provided there. libsel4platsupport
depends on it. I had to add Spike platform with very basic implementa-
tion just to get over build dependencies.
libsel4platsupport: For RISC-V it has to be ported to provide the
bootstrapping and the exe entry point __sel4_start for the root task.
It gets the boot frame address from the seL4 microkernel, constructs
the stack vector as muslc expects, and then jumps to the normal muslc
_start entry, enabling it to populate the libc environment's data struc-
tures with its details, initializes TLS, ﬁles and stdio handlers, etc. Finally
the muslc task bootstrap procedure jumps to the user's main() function,
or the root task, which in our use case is SOS.
libcpio: used by SOS to parse the cpio archive, searching for user
binaries.
libcpio: This one is used by SOS to parse the ELF binaries extracted
from the cpio archive. Hence SOS can read the ELF's section headers,
and do the loading/mapping consequently.
libsel4cpace: a library provided to abstract away the details of seL4
CSpace management, this library had to also be ported for RISC-V. It
is used by SOS to construct tasks' CSpace.
mapping: SOS comes with mapping.c ﬁle that is needed in con-
junction with elf.c to load/map the user ELF binaries. It is ported
to RISC-V and it invokes the newly provided RISC-V system calls like
seL4_RISCV_Page_Map and seL4_RISCV_PageTable_Map.
Other libraries (like libmuslcsys and libsel4vka) had to be modiﬁed to
be aware of the new RISC-V architecture and just modiﬁed to be built,
again to get over other required libraries dependency.
Figure 4.11 shows the run-time steps for a complete SOS/seL4 to
execute until it reaches the highest level application of the stack (tty
application).
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Figure 4.11: seL4/SOS bootstrap procedure
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4.5 Conclusion
seL4 microkernel is more sophisticated than RTEMS. It relies on message-
passing to communicate between its diﬀerent subsystems, which makes
it scalable, and a better ﬁt to run on NoC-based SoC. A complete seL4
project would involve seL4 microkernel and many other tools and li-
braries (there were over 20 repositories that were involved to run SOS
on seL4). This makes it far bigger than an RTEMS systems. However,
thanks to its modular design and message passing mechanism that mi-
crokernels in general agree on, it is possible to scatter seL4-based system
across distributed cores that can be in a form of memories, heterogeneous
cores, accelerators, etc. That said, the small seL4 microkernel can run
on one or more (RISC-V) cores, and its libraries and applications might
run on other, possibly heterogeneous, cores that perform better on, and
all of these subsystems communicating with each other via a standard
(message-passing) interface. This way, it is no longer needed to constrain
a system to run a speciﬁc OS (that might not perform well with some
application requirements) and to run it on a homogeneous SMP (single
ABI/architecture) like with RTEMS on Epiphany NoC. We now have
the freedom to modify both software (seL4 as a hypervisor and its appli-
cations that can be other OSs) and hardware (RISC-V based SoC with
other pluggable heterogeneous cores and NoCs).
Now to link with issues mentioned in section 2.4. Regarding the
memory system, it is a very conventional one with MMU and 4 KiB
pages for both 32 and 64 bit address spaces. This makes seL4 (and Linux)
happy enough to run there, but does not give an advantage over any other
architecture, instead it inherits the page-based issues discussed in the
section 2.4. Perhaps this can be enhanced in the future due the ﬂexibility
of RISC-V architecture. Cache coherency is irrelevant since it is not yet
part of RISC-V standard, but an implementation can choose whether to
implement it or not. The good thing is that RISC-V architecture can be
extended to support other new features (given that it is mainly a research
open-source architecture) and memory models as required.
The most irritating thing about porting seL4 to RISC-V (Rocket Core
and Spike), is its Host Target Interface (HTIF) interface. It is a totally
new interface, that needs programming and special handling to construct
and send packets with format a host device would understand. This
needs support from both a target OS (to construct commands and data
82
packets and send them, which requires M-mode instructions), and the
host device (to receive packets, interpret them and handle commands).
Luckily, HTIF is a good example of how a new core (and IO device)
interface should not be implemented. Moreover, RISC-V does debug/IO
access using special purpose CSRxx instructions, which is not portable,
neither easy to adopt, given that there is no current documentation for
this interface.
Finally, RISC-V does not provide (enough) speciﬁcations neither seri-
ously consider the multi-core heterogeneous issues and how cores commu-
nicate, at least not yet. Also, there is no implementation or speciﬁcation
details of the RISC-V hypervisor mode, which could be of a big beneﬁt
for seL4 given that microkernels have been successfully used as secured
software hypervisors.
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Chapter 5
Operating System Support on
Multi-core Architecture
5.1 Discussion
This chapter concludes the research, programming and development
eﬀorts for this thesis, and according to that, it provides the requirements
for both OSs and (multi-core) hardware architectures, and ﬁnally it
suggests solutions for such requirements.
The overall development eﬀort includes:
1. RTEMS port to Epiphany, MicroBlaze, OpenRISC and RISC-V
architectures both SMP and shared memory multiprocessing.
2. seL4 microkernel Port to RISC-V architecture.
3. RISC-V Vscale core integration to OpenRISC wishbone-based Fus-
eSoC.
As noticed in the previous chapters, the trend is moving to hetero-
geneous multi-core architectures, but each vendor (or organization) de-
sign their own customized hardware that communicates in a diﬀerent
way than one another, whether from software or hardware perspectives.
Moreover, vendors most likely provide their own toolchain, and their own
device drivers sometimes enforcing license issues to them.
This makes it harder for OSs to be ported to such new architec-
tures. An example of this is an attempt to merge the work of RTEMS
(open-source) port to MicroBlaze (by Xilinx), and the main issue that
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prohibited this merge is the commercial licence that Xilinx enforces to
its software code.
The opposite case is clear with RISC-V, which is all open-source, and
although it is a new architecture, there have been many people working
on OS ports to RISC-V. Currently there are: Linux, FreeBSD, seL4 and
RTEMS ports. seL4 and RTEMS ports are part of the eﬀort of this thesis.
This thesis suggests (from OS point of view) that (heterogeneous)
multi-core hardware architectures should be:
1. Easy to program.
2. Portable (takes less eﬀort to add OS support for it).
3. Scalable.
4. Communication-transparent.
5. Flexible.
6. Secure.
7. Easy to identify/address.
Easy to program The problem with some heterogeneous architectures
is that they provide their own special purpose instructions, registers or
interfaces to handle inter-core communications. This does require doc-
umentation from the architecture vendors and software developers are
required to understand and grasp how to write low-level code (at the
assembly level) that manages the cores. Moreover, it requires support
from the toolchain mainly the linker and compiler (in the case of GNU,
this is binutils and GCC).
Examples of this problem are the MicroBlaze's Fast Simplex Link
(FSL) and UC Berkeley's host-target interface (HTIF) for their RISC-
V SoC implementation. FSL core comes with documentation, but still
the programmer has to read and understand how it works from MicroB-
laze and other connected cores, as well as the programming interface.
The problem with RISC-V is even worse. It does not provide any doc-
umentation, except for some code examples. And from such examples,
the programmers have to know how to construct a packet to be sent
to the host using a system call via a usage of some special purpose
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registers like (mtohost, mfromhost), and magic memory that contains
the data packet(s). Clearly this was a downside for people who wanted
to use the Rocket Core (the UC Berkeley implementation of RISC-V),
with HTIF. This made other projects like lowRISC to work on removing
such target-dependent interface. Similarly, I worked on integrating the
VScale/RISC-V core to OpenRISC-based projects, removing any use of
HTIF interface and only relying on wishbone interface. This actually
enabled a RISC-V to make use of many other open-source cores that are
wishbone compliant, and supported by other boards.
Portable (takes less eﬀort to add OS support for it) This is
tightly correlated to the previous requirement. If there is a standard
way for cores to address each other, this will save programmers a lot
of time reading the documentation and programming the hardware. In
fact portability can be as easy as just copying C code for one driver that
works with some OS on a given CPU, and pasting it to a totally diﬀerent
OS that executes on another CPU.
An example of this is the NS16550 UART interface. The exact same
driver for one RTEMS BSP can be used for another RTEMS BSP with
another CPU. In fact, when I was implementing the UART driver for
seL4 port to RISC-V/QEMU, I just copied the source code of the driver
from RTEMS/OpenRISC port to seL4. This is certainly not the case
with HTIF interface, or similar SoCs that include MicroBlaze. Both
need a considerable eﬀort, logic, and code size to implement a console
driver.
Scalable Scalability issues with mutli-core systems have diﬀerent pa-
rameters and aspects from hardware and software sides. Shared data
structures and shared physical memory are great bottlenecks with scal-
ability. The shared data structure issue is somehow solved by factoring
the OSs as discussed with FOS, or keeping each core's data structures
local with no sharing and only message passing to preserve consistency
as with Multikernel. While this is a good solution and improves scala-
bility issue, the hardware implementation is still a problem. Hardware
caches that are used with Barrelﬁsh port in x86-based architecture are
restricting the boost of the multikernel design.
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Communication transparent Programmers do not have to worry
about what communication fabric is used to connect diﬀerent cores
whether it is a network on chip, bus or direct links. However, it may
sometimes be useful to actually control the communication medium as
discussed in [78] where software is controlling network on chips, and
with Raw microprocessor [93] where software controls the crossbar. Still,
security and privilege level should be considered when it comes to OS
management, but the good idea is to embrace exokernel and microker-
nel models by exporting such new hardware features to applications for
reasons like that applications better know their needs, and it is better to
keep the kernel small and simple (and veriﬁed like with seL4).
Flexible One of the major problems that OSs are restricted to cur-
rently (even the research ones) are the limitation of some hardware fea-
tures that were originally developed for uniprocessor systems and evolved
from there. A clear example of this is cache units. Caches are huge bot-
tleneck for scalability especially when the number of cores increases. This
is mainly due to the requirement of achieving consistency between cached
versions on diﬀerent cores of a shared data structure. Even multikernel
design which embraces no sharing and locality of data structures is still
being restricted to using caches even if they do not need it. Further-
more, Barrelﬁsh is using cache lines for communication between diﬀerent
kernels on diﬀerent nodes. Other examples of making use of caches are
scalable locks that try to be placed on diﬀerent lines of caches not to be
contended over, replaced or false shared. Similarly, another restriction is
relying on virtualisation and protection features (i.e. page-size, MMU,
Intel's VTx) of a given hardware like with Quest-V on Intel.
The previous examples not only need considerable amount of un-
derstanding and implementation eﬀort from the programmer, but also
are simply non portable. A software implementation that assumes some
very speciﬁc cache features like coherency protocol or cache line size will
simply fail when it moves to another diﬀerent architectures with minor
diﬀerences (i.e. cache line size). OSs should not rely on these kinds of
features at all, rather, it can provide access control only, and leave the
policy to applications. From the hardware side, architecture designers
should not force programmers to use some features like caches, MMU,
etc, at least to provide the option to simply disable them.
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Secure Security is of major concern for OSs. From exokernel to mono-
lithic, all agree that the kernel at least should guarantee some form of
security between applications with each other and applications and the
kernel. Providing such security/protection scheme can be supported by
software-only libraries and mechanisms, or hardware enforcement. Most
current hardware architectures do provide help for software to enforce
protection. This can be a form of diﬀerent privilege levels for each soft-
ware type (kernel, application, hypervisors, etc), MMU, and/or even
some new hardware capability implementation like CHERI [102]. Se-
curity and protection can even be of physical separation like what FOS
suggests that each core holds its own kernel/application, without mess-
ing with other cores. Capability software for access control works great
like discussed earlier with seL4; it works to the level where seL4 has been
totally formally veriﬁed being the ﬁrst world's OS kernel proven to have
no bugs. While software-only capability model works well, it can work
better with hardware-capability implementation like CHERI, improving
performance, hardware security enforcement, and formal veriﬁcation.
Currently memory management units are mostly providing page-
based translation/protection. This might not be a good idea wasting
memory for applications that want smaller protection granularity. Also,
an RTOS like RTEMS with small memory footprints and performance
requirements would not work well with 4 KiB page-based protection. In
fact, most RTEMS targets just abandon using MMU because it can not
aﬀord the overhead of: n-level page-table translations, few TLBs entries
with costly operations, cache (being non deterministic), and fragmenta-
tion caused when there is a need for protection over small amount of
memory less than the smallest page granularity oﬀered by the hardware.
CHERI provides some hardware solutions for the previous issues, but
it has not been deployed by OSs that really need it like RTEMS and
seL4, not yet.
Identiﬁcation/addressing It is not a good idea that for each core in
a heterogeneous system, there is a diﬀerent way to identify and address
it. A standard way for addressing other cores in the system is preferred,
regardless of the type of the core whether it is CPU, FPGA, GPU, UART,
etc. Thus, dealing with other cores as black boxes with shared standard
interface would hugely ease the identiﬁcation, addressing and commu-
nication processes that are managed by the kernel. Furthermore, the
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same exact code can be used for addressing diﬀerent cores by providing
diﬀerent parameters (i.e. core ID).
5.2 Proposed Solutions And Future Work
Using shared address space (not just for memory)
Shared address space is not just for memory. It can be used to address
other cores including IO memory mapped devices. The downside of this
is the waste of some address space bits. However, with 64-bit regis-
ters/addressing, especially with embedded systems, this would not be an
issue. Both Tilera and Epiphany, as scalable multi-core chips, provide
32 and 64 bit address spaces respectively, with only the former having a
cache unit and virtual addressing.
There are many advantages of using memory mapped cores (let's not
call it devices any more). Rather than using special instructions and
registers for controlling other cores, just use addresses. This is the case
with Epiphany and FuseSoC (OpenRISC-based) currently, and porting
RTEMS and seL4 to them was much more easier than RISC-V with
HTIF for example. Thus, controlling other cores and communicating
with it would not need any special instructions. A clear example of
this is copying the UART driver of RTEMS on OpenRISC to seL4 on
QEMU/RISC-V, without changing any code (except the base address).
This greatly helps with easy-to-program, and portable issues.
Partitioned Global Address Space (PGAS) is a promising subset
programming model of this idea. The RTEMS port on Epiphany
implicitly utilised such a model but from OS side. As discussed in
chapter 3, RTEMS made use of the local memories for some of its
critical data/code sections like context switch and interrupt handling,
while it placed other code and data structures on other remote memories
(both remote fast memories of other core's local memories and external
oﬀ-chip DRAM).
The Heterogeneous System Architecture (HSA) foundation proposes
some standards for heterogeneous systems but their eﬀort focuses on par-
allel computing (CPU and GPU). As with this thesis suggests, unediﬁed
address space is embraced. However, HSA still assumes virtual memory
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management, page-tables, and cache coherency which may not be very
eﬃcient with scalability and real-time requirements.
Giving each core a memory mapped area part of the address space
that has a base address, and bound is enough. This area frame can con-
tain control registers, memories, interrupt control registers, buﬀers, etc.
An overall target-related ﬁles can be then imported for both hardware
and software systems, including base addresses for each core and its size.
To use such cores it will be as easy as just including such a single header
ﬁle with base addresses and use shared drivers, either existing part of the
OS library, or provided by the core's vendor.
A case study for that might be converting RTEMS shared memory
driver that is used by some targets to support multiprocessing (diﬀerent
RTEMS objects executing on diﬀerent nodes/cores), into hardware im-
plementation (memory mapped) for accessing another core (perhaps part
of the communication medium like NoC or wishbone bus). Hence, the
same exact code would not be changed, while the hardware implemen-
tation does. This way, the same code might work with shared memory,
NoC, or buses.
Standard Interface (cores dealt with as black boxes)
From the OS side, the single address space and memory mapped cores
can be considered a standard interface. From the hardware side, some
standard interface might be a good idea to just plug-in new cores. This
idea has proven its validity when I removed the HTIF interface of the
VScale/RISC-V core and wrapped it up with the standard wishbone
interface that FuseSoC/OpenRISC uses. It beneﬁted from many other
open source cores that can be easily plugged there.
The interface does not have to assume any core attributes, core de-
signers have to just wrap their cores with such interface and it would be
ready to be integrated part of other SoCs.
It then would not matter what the interconnection fabric is (from
the core point of view), whether it is a bus, network on chip, or even a
cloud. The interconnection medium itself would do the job of routing and
serving the request. This way, a single core can be plugged to diﬀerent
network on chips, buses, or whatever, given that all of them comply with
some interface standard like wishbone or AXI.
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Figure 5.1: Wishbone Interface [57]
Capabilities for access control of heterogeneous cores
Capabilities for access control receieved attention again with microkernels
like Fiasco.OC and seL4. It also helped with seL4 veriﬁcation, proving
that it has no bugs. Capabilities can be of any type. For example in seL4
there are frame, IPC, untyped memories and endpoints capabilities. For
heterogeneous system, new capabilities types can be added if needed,
giving an access control for one application running on one core to have
access to another core (including control register, data, memory, etc).
The capability type can be mapped to the core's type (CPU, UART, local
memory, etc), or just using frame capabilities if such cores are memory
mapped.
The above idea has actually been implemented above the seL4/RISC-
V port, giving the root-task a frame capability by which it can manage
booting/oﬀ-loading RTEMS (and even another seL4 kernel instance) to
run on another RISC-V core.
CHERI on the same track, embracing capability model, is a hardware
implementation of capability model based on MIPS processor. Both seL4
and CHERI would be a best ﬁt, reducing the software code for managing
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capabilities in seL4, improving performance, and enforcing hardware se-
curity by features provided by CHERI, along with byte granularity, and
formal veriﬁcation goals that both share.
Protection can be enforced then using MMU (like with seL4 frames),
or either base and bound methods like with CHERI and machine mode
on RISC-V.
Space and Power-aware Scheduling
In the near future, we might have a system where the number of cores
would exceed the number of required processes; in this case there would
not be a need for costly operations like context switching, MMU/page-
table (or capabilities) that enforce security/virtualization, instead secu-
rity would be enforced by physically separating cores. This model could
be early noticed with RTEMS on Epiphany with 16 cores given that
RTEMS is simple enough that it does not need MMU, and 16 tasks are
more than enough for it.
Research then will focus on how these physically separated cores
share data and/or physical resources as well as how they communicate
with each other. As FOS predicts, the big issue at this time will be
how to do space scheduling (rather than the conventional time-sharing
scheduling on a single CPU) by dynamically assigning one or more
(heterogeneous) cores to a process to satisfy its requirements, including
location, distance, power management, communication medium and/or
types of the cores. An example of this is to place seL4 microkernel on
one core, and an application that handles matrix calculations (GPU
device driver) on another core. Both have to be close to each other, and
somehow the communication should be deterministic if it is a real-time
application. Another example which has been already implemented as a
prototype part of this thesis is running seL4 microkernel on a supervisor
core, while oﬀ-loading RTEMS to another real-time friendly core.
The scheduler (whether it is implemented in user-mode, kernel-mode,
or even on hardware) can be extended to handle further operations like
load balancing, routing, and power management (voltage control or en-
abling/disabling cores for example). This will require the hardware to
provide new structures for OSs (schedulers) to monitor and handle such
operations. MMU protection would not make much more sense there,
rather, capabilities can take place to enforce access control of which/how
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application/core can access other cores or data structures.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
Computer architecture is already taking serious ﬁrst steps to the new era
of multi-core SoC, that would absolutely need both hardware and soft-
ware cooperation. With this new architecture in mind, it would require
some amount of compatibility support for software that assumes power-
ful features originally developed on uniprocessor systems. New challenges
have been already triggered while trying to adopt such concepts, along
with ensuring scalability of both the hardware and software, other new
features may even be invented.
This thesis addresses the design and implementation issues of OSs
on multi-core architectures, both theoretically and by attacking such is-
sues by getting hands-on experience of porting diﬀerent kernel designs to
multi-core hardware architectures.
The literature review chapter lists the evolution of hardware archi-
tectures from uniprocessor to multi-core processors, along with other
scalability related features like cache coherency and memory model.
Then OS kernel designs and examples were discussed, and how they
perform on diﬀerent hardware architectures. Each OS design has
advantages and disadvantages, so there has been a long-term trade-oﬀ
between diﬀerent kernel designs like microkernels and monolithic kernels.
Some of them do well on given hardware architectures, but others do
not. For example, microkernels are scalable on many-core chips, but has
poor performance on one or few cores compared to monolithic kernels,
while monolithic kernels overtake microkernels on a single or few cores.
Security, real-time, virtualisation, scalability, performance, minimality
and safety-critical requirements are other examples of such trade-oﬀs
between diﬀerent kernel designs. Since the concern of this thesis is
multi-core chips (and scalability), examples of OSs running on SMP and
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multi-core chips were discussed next like RTEMS, seL4, Quest and FOS,
and the trade-oﬀs are discussed in more details there.
In order to to have an actual real-world experience of the OSs
challenges on multi-core chips, chapter three reports the porting process
of RTEMS (SMP) as a real-time OS to Epiphany multi-core chip.
RTEMS SMP support is currently being developed, so this allowed
us to do some analysis of the challenges and design decisions taken
when adding support for originally uniprocessor OS, to run on SMP
and multi-core hardware. This chapter discussed SMP related data
structures involved within RTEMS that are target-independent as well as
how the Epiphany and Parallella architecture features ﬁt with RTEMS
requirements. Such features are like addressing modes, communications
between (heterogeneous) cores and most importantly the memory model.
Three versions of RTEMS implementations were discussed, trading oﬀ
kernel design, performance, size and features.
Because microkernels are superb when it comes to scalability, chapter
4 takes another L4 microkernel called seL4, which is considered the
most secure state-of-art microkernel currently, as an experimental kernel
design to run on a new research hardware architecture called RISC-V.
The experience of porting seL4 to RISC-V gave us the insight of what
are the basic requirements of seL4 as a secure microkernel that it needs
from a hardware architecture like RISC-V. Such requirements are like:
diﬀerent privilege modes, page-based protection and high performance
support from hardware to implement the most crucial component of
microkernelsIPC.
Finally chapter ﬁve gives some general requirements of OSs and multi-
core architectures followed by some proposed solutions that may do bet-
ter than the existing discussed ones, citing some new research hardware
implementation like capability-based hardware that might replace some
hardware features like MMU, and do even better especially with the
forthcoming many-core chips. Also chapter ﬁve credits the good (and
bad) hardware design and implementation decisions experienced during
porting RTEMS and seL4 to RISC-V/Spike, Epiphany/Parallella, Mi-
croBlaze and OpenRISC/FuseSoC hardware architectures, including ad-
dress space, addressing and communication between cores, simplicity of
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programming and scalability issues.
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Abbreviations
SMP Symmetric Multiprocessing
OS Operating System
SOS Simple Operating System
RTOS Rea-time Operating System
FOS Factored Operating System
RTEMS Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems
UMA Uniform Memory Access
NUMA Non-Uniform Memory Access
ccNUMA Cache Coherent Non-Uniform Memory Access
NoC Network on Chip
MPSoC Multiprocessor System on Chip
MMU Memory Management Unit
TLB Translation Lookaside Buﬀer
PTE Page Table Entry
GPU Graphics Processing Unit
CHERI Capability Hardware Enhanced RISC Instructions
DSM Distributed Shared Memory
IPC Inter Process Communication
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter
IO Input Output Devices
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ISA Instruction Set Architecture
libOS Library Operating System
ASID Address Space Identiﬁcation
ABI Application Binary Interface
EDF Earliest Deadline First
BSP Board Support Package
GCC GNU Compiler Collection
TCB Task Control Block
DMA Direct Memory Access
IPI Inter Processor Interrupt
FP Floating Point
SDK Software Development Kit
HTIF Host Target Interface
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